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Abstract Before starting a rigorous security analysis
of a given software system, the most likely outcome is
often already clear, namely that the system is not entirely
secure.Modifying a program such that it passes the anal-
ysis is a difficult problem and usually left entirely to the
programmer. In this article, we show that and how uni-
fication can be used to compute such program transfor-
mations. This opens a new perspective on the problemof
correcting insecure programs. We also demonstrate that
integrating our approach into an existing transforming
type system can improve the precision of the analysis
and the quality of the resulting programs.
Keywords Language-based security · Information
flow control · Security type system · Unification
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Restrictions on the permitted flow of information are
often adequate for expressing security requirements like
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confidentiality or integrity. Information flow control
goes beyond access control in that it not only controls
which data a program accesses but also how the data is
propagated within the program after a legitimate access.
That is, the aim is to secure the process of computing,
which includes providing adequate protection against
unwanted information release and data corruption by
accidentally flawed programs as well as by malicious
code.
One approach to automatically analyzing the flow of
information in concrete programs is the use of security
type systems. Intuitively, the security type of a program
captures how information can flow during its execution.
For deriving the security type of a given program, one
applies the rules of the type system. Given a security
type, the rules can also be used to check if a program
has this type. Usually, programs have a security type
only if they cannot cause insecure information flow.
That is, if type checking succeeds for some type then
the given program is secure. Conversely, if type check-
ing fails then the program might be insecure and should
not be run.
When type checking fails, the task of correcting the
program is usually left to the programmer. However,
making a program secure can be intellectually challeng-
ing aswell as tedious.Hence, it would be highly desirable
to better support the programmer in this task.
We envision automated tool support on two levels:
1. for providing advice and suggestions to program-
mers on how a program could be interactively
improved,
2. for automatically correcting some insecure
programs or parts of programs without any need
for interaction.
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The long-term goal is a framework that incorporates
both levels, but this is beyond the scope of the current
article. Here, we focus solely on the second level, i.e.,
the fully automatic correction of some programs. For
describing such program transformations, we employ
transforming security type systems. The difference to
non-transforming type systems is that if a given pro-
gram is insecure then a transforming type system need
not reject the program, but may modify it instead.
Obviously, one cannot allow an automatic transfor-
mation tomodifyprograms in completely arbitraryways.
The corrected program should not only be secure, but
also resemble theoriginal program in awell-definedway.
1.2 Approach and contributions
We define the objectives of the program transformation
with two equivalence relations:  and . The first rela-
tionship captures in which sense a transformed program
should resemble the original program. The second rela-
tionship captures the observational capabilities of the
attacker by defining what is indistinguishable for him.
A transformation takes a program C as input and
returns a transformed program C′. The transformation
process is sound only if C  C′ holds and if the attacker
cannot distinguish between alternative executions of C′
that occur depending on some secret. For instance, if the
value of the guard B in a conditional if B then C1 else C2
depends on a secret then the branches must be obser-
vationally equivalent for the attacker, i.e., C1  C2,
because, otherwise, the attackermight be able to deduce
the secret. Thepartial equivalence relation (PER)model
[13] even reduces the problem of making an entire pro-
gram secure to the problem of making the program
observationally equivalent to itself.
Our general framework for transformations is para-
metric in the relations  and . On a technical level,
a transformation makes use of meta-variables, substi-
tutions, and unification. A given program is prepared
for the transformation by inserting meta-variables in
suitable positions. The relationship  provides a natu-
ral constraint on the placement of meta-variables and
on the range of substitutions. The meta-variables allow
us to reduce the problem of making alternative execu-
tion paths equivalent under  to the problem of finding
a suitable substitution for the inserted meta-variables.
Unification is the means for computing such substitu-
tions.
We investigate in detail an instance of our approach
that eliminates differences in the timing behavior of
alternative branches. Such differences could otherwise
reveal to an attacker the actual execution path and,
hence, the secrets on which the control flow depends.
For this instance, we develop a calculus for inserting
meta-variables and a transforming type system based on
unification. We demonstrate that the problem of finding
suitable substitutions in this instance can be reduced
to a well-known unification problem: AC1 unification
with free constructors [7]. This reduction allows one to
employ existing unification algorithms for computing
unifiers, though this does not yet constitute an optimal
solution.Wepropose an optimized unification algorithm
that better exploits the specific structure of the unifica-
tion problems originating during the transformation.
Rather than developing a type system completely
from scratch, we build on an existing type system [14].
One benefit of this choice is that we can compare our
approach in detail with the cross-copying technique [1]
that is used in [14]. In comparison to [14], the main
advantages of our transforming type system are:
Improved precision. Our type system accepts some
secureprograms that are rejectedby theoriginal type
system, and it can correct some insecure programs
that cannot be corrected by the original type system.
Better corrections. Our transformation returns pro-
grams that are faster and often substantially smaller
in size.
Broader scope.Our transformation can be applied in
the context of security policies with more than two
levels.
Besides these technical advantages, unification yields
a very natural perspective on the problem of making
two programs observationally equivalent. However, we
do not claim that using unification is the only way to
achieve these technical advantages, or that it will solve
all problems with repairing insecure programs. In fact,
the described instance of our framework is themost con-
vincing instance that we have found so far and indicates
the likely class of transformationswithin our framework.
1.3 Related work
Analyzing the information flow in computing systems
requires techniques that go beyond the analysis of safety
and liveness properties. Rather than inspecting each of
the traces in isolation, one must analyze the entirety of
possible systembehaviors [10]. Inparticular, it is not pos-
sible to dynamically enforce all information flow prop-
erties by techniques such as execution monitoring [15].
Static analysis, on the other hand, allows one to derive
guarantees that cover all system traces.
Type-based approaches to analyzing the security of
the informationflow in concrete programshave received
much attention in recent years. A good overview of the
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research area language-based information flow security
is given in [12]. Here, we focus on approaches that
involve transformations for making programs secure.
The focus of such transformations has been on the
problem of making the branches of conditionals obser-
vationally equivalent for a given attacker. An early pro-
posal, though not yet a transformation, can be found in
the work by Volpano and Smith [16]. They investigate
a simple multi-threaded programming language where
they require entire conditionals to be executed atomi-
cally, ruling out differences in the duration of alternative
execution paths. Moreover, they forbid assignments to
variables that are observable for the attacker in order
to avoid other differences in the observable behavior.
However, the atomic execution of entire conditionals
severely constrains parallelism. A less restrictive solu-
tion was proposed by Sabelfeld and Sands [14]. Their
transforming type system sequentially composes each
branch of a conditional with a program that simulates
the timing behavior of the respective other branch. This
cross-copying transformation ensures identical timing
behavior of the branches in the transformed program.
Like in [16], assignments to variables are forbidden if
their values can be observed by the attacker. While
the cross-copying technique does not require the atomic
execution of conditionals, and hence appears more suit-
able for concurrent programs, it also causes a significant
performance overhead by unnecessarily increasing the
running time of conditionals (as elaborated in Sect. 6).
Another problem is that the transformation can intro-
duce non-termination into a program. This problem is
addressed, and partially solved, in [11] by composing
the cross-copied programs concurrently (rather than
sequentially).
The cross-copying technique was originally proposed
for a sequential language by Agat [1]. Recently, two fur-
ther transformations have been proposed for the
sequential setting. Barthe et al. [2] proposed a vari-
ant of the cross-copying technique that is based on a
transaction mechanism. Each branch is wrapped in a
transaction and then sequentially composed with the
respective other branch. The transaction around the
original branch is committed, while the cross-copied
transaction is aborted. This technique is applicable to
object-oriented languages with exceptions and methods
calls. However, it is not clear if and how it could be lifted
to a multi-threaded setting. Hedin and Sands [6] give
a semantic security condition for alternative execution
paths in the context of a sequential low-level language
and informally sketch a transformation.
The approach introduced in the current article is suit-
able for a multi-threaded setting. In comparison to prior
work, the performance overhead for a transformed
program is minimized, and branches may contain
assignments to variables that are observable by the
attacker. A detailed, technical comparison is provided
in Sect. 6.
1.4 Overview
Section 2 introduces the general framework for using
unification in transformational typing. The framework
is instantiated by defining concrete relations  and 
in Sect. 3, and the instance is integrated into an exist-
ing transforming type system in Sect. 4. Possibilities
for automating the transformation are investigated in
Sect. 5. This includes the reduction to AC1-unification
as well as the proposal of a tailored unification algo-
rithm. The merits of the proposed approach are dis-
cussed and put into perspective with related work in
Sect. 6. Section 7 concludes the article. Proofs for all
technical results can be found in the appendix.
2 A framework for making programs secure
2.1 Scope of the transformation
Assume the viewpoint of an attacker ζ who observes
the program during execution. The security policy is
that no information must flow from variables that store
secret data to the variables that the attacker can observe
during a program run. We use h to denote variables
that store secrets and refer to such variables as high
variables. Variables that ζ can observe are referred to
as low variables, and we use l to denote a low
variable.
We distinguish two classes of information leaks:
Intra-command leaks. Information leakage occurs
within a single command. For instance, after exe-
cuting l := h the terminal value of l equals the initial
value of h.
Inter-command leaks. Information leakage results
from the interplay between different commands. For
instance, after executing if h then l := 1 else l := 0, the
terminal value of l equals the initial value of h.1
In this article, we focus on the removal of inter-com-
mand leaks.Generally, such leaks canoccur if the control
flow depends on a secret and if the alternative execution
1 Intra-command leaks are also known as explicit leaks and inter-
command leaks as implicit leaks [5]. Some authors further distin-
guish, e.g., timing and termination leaks [14].
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paths yield different observations for the attacker. An
inter-command leak involves some language primitive
that conditionally affects the control flow like, e.g., an
if-then-else statement, a while-loop, a conditional jump,
a dynamic method dispatch, or an exception. For reduc-
ing the complexity, we focus on conditionals, i.e., if–
then–else statements with high guards throughout the
article.
2.2 Observational capabilities of the attacker
Inter-command leaks can be eliminated by making the
branches of conditionals with high guards observation-
ally equivalent. Such a transformation makes it impos-
sible for a given attacker to deduce the value of the
high guard as he cannot tell from his observations which
branch was chosen. A prerequisite for applying this
approach is a clear understanding of what the attacker
ζ can observe during the execution of a program.
Common assumptions are, e.g., that the attacker can
observe the values of low variables only at the end of
a program run or that he can also observe the values
of low variables in intermediate states. He might make
further observations like, e.g., the time at which values
of low variables are modified, whether a program run
terminates, or how long a program run takes. Whether
a given program is secure or not depends closely on the
observational capabilities of the attacker.
Example 1 The program P1 = l := h copies the value of
h into l and, hence, causes secret information to flow
into l. This violates the security policy given that the
attacker ζ can observe the values of low variables at
least at the end of a program run. Similarly, the program
P2 = if h then l := 1 else l := 0 copies a Boolean value from
h to l.
The program P3 = l := h; l := 0 obeys the security pol-
icy given that ζ can only observe the values of low vari-
ables after termination. This is because the final value
of l is 0, independent of the value of h. However, if ζ
can observe the values of l in intermediate states during
a run then the program is insecure.
The programP4 = if h then (skip; l := 1) else l := 1 obeys
the security policy under the assumption that ζ is not
capable of observing the time at which the assignments
to l occur and the duration of program execution. Oth-
erwise, the program is insecure because the timing of
the assignments and the duration of the execution both
vary depending on the value of h.
The observational capabilities of an attacker can be
expressed with equivalence relations. An equivalence
relation =ζ on states can be used to capture what the
attacker ζ observes in an individual state: s1 =ζ s2 means
that ζ makes the same observations in the state s1 as in
the state s2. An equivalence relation ζ on configura-
tions (i.e., pairs of programs and states) can be used to
capture that ζ ’s observations when program C1 is run in
state s1 equal ζ ’s observations when C2 is run in s2.
Example 2 If ζ can observe only the value of the vari-
able l then s1 =ζ s2 holds if and only if s1(l) = s2(l), i.e.,
if the value of l in s1 equals the value of l in s2.
Consider the programP1 = l := h fromExample 1 and
states s1 and s2 such that s1(l) = s2(l) = 0, s1(h) = 0,
and s2(h) = 1. Then 〈|P1, s1|〉 ζ 〈|P1, s2|〉 because s′1(l) =
0 = 1 = s′2(l) where s′1 and s′2 is the state after running
l := h in s1 and in s2, respectively.
From notions of indistinguishablity of states and config-
urations one can derive a notion of indistinguishability
of programs. Set C1 ζ C2 if and only if, for all obser-
vationally equivalent states s1 and s2 (s1 =ζ s2), the
configurations (C1, s1) and (C2, s2) are observationally
equivalent, i.e., (C1, s1) ζ (C2, s2). The resulting rela-
tion on programs is only a PER, i.e., a transitive and
symmetric relation that need not be reflexive. Not being
observationally equivalent to itself means for a program
C that running C in two indistinguishable states may
lead to different observations. In this way, differences
between the initial states are revealed, which lets ζ learn
secret information. This view point is the key to captur-
ing secure information flow in the PER model [13] in
which a program is secure if and only if it is observation-
ally equivalent to itself.
Example 3 ConsiderP1 = l := h and the attacker ζ from
Example 2. In such a scenario, P1 is not observationally
equivalent to itself as there are two indistinguishable
states s1 and s2 such that the configurations 〈|P1, s1|〉 and
〈|P1, s2|〉 are not observationally equivalent (as demon-
strated in Example 2).
However, it not only depends on the observational capa-
bilities of the attacker whether a given program should
be considered secure or not. Another relevant factor is
the context in which the program operates.
Example 4 Assume P4 = if h then (skip; l := 1) else l := 1
from Example 1 runs concurrently with P5 = skip; l := 0
under a shared memory and a round robin scheduler.
Then the final value of l is 0 given that the initial value
of h is 0. Moreover, the final value of l is 1 given that
the initial value of h is 1. This is illustrated below where
(vl, vh) denotes the state s with s(l) = vl and s(h) = vh:
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〈|〈P4,P5〉, (0, 0)|〉
 〈|〈l := 1,P5〉, (0, 0)|〉
 〈|〈l := 1, l := 0〉, (0, 0)|〉
 〈|〈l := 0〉, (1, 0)|〉
 〈|〈〉, (0, 0)|〉
〈|〈P4,P5〉, (0, 1)|〉
 〈|〈(skip; l := 1),P5〉, (0, 1)|〉
 〈|〈(skip; l := 1), l := 0〉, (0, 1)|〉
 〈|〈l := 1, l := 0〉, (0, 1)|〉
 〈|〈l := 1〉, (0, 1)|〉
 〈|〈〉, (1, 1)|〉
That is, the final value of l equals the initial value of h
and, hence, an attacker who can observe the final value
of l is able to reconstruct the initial value of h.
Weargued inExample 1 thatP4 is insecure if the attacker
canobserve the timingbehavior of the program, and that
it is secure, in a sequential context, if the attacker cannot
observe the timing behavior. The interesting point illus-
trated by Example 4 is that the program becomes inse-
cure in a multi-threaded context for the same attacker
(i.e., onewho is not able to observe the timing behavior).
More generally, a program can be secure in a sequen-
tial setting for given observational capabilities of an
attacker, while the same program is insecure in a con-
current setting for the same attacker. It is possible to
take such aspects of the execution environment already
into account when defining observational equivalence.
Example 5 Assume skip; l := 1 ζ l := 1. For such a rela-
tion ζ , the program P4 = if h then (skip; l := 1) else l := 1
from Example 4 is classified as insecure, because the
branches of the conditional are not equivalent under
ζ . This is a sensible classification of P4 if programs
under analysis shall run in parallel with other threads.
2.3 The transformation
We view the problem of making the branches of a con-
ditional equivalent under a given relation ζ as a unifi-
cation problem on lifted programs. To lift a program, we
insert meta-variables that can be substituted during the
transformation. Suitable substitutions are computed by
unification, for instance, when applying a transforming
typing rule for conditionals of the following form:
C1 ↪→ C′1 C2 ↪→ C′2 σ ∈ U({C′1 ζ C′2})
if B then C1 else C2 ↪→ if B then σC′1 else σC′2
That is, each branch is transformed into a secure pro-
gram, resulting in C′1 and C
′
2, respectively. Unification
is used to compute a unifier σ that makes C′1 and C
′
2
observationally equivalent under the relation ζ . The
transformed program, if B then σC′1 else σC
′
2, is intui-
tively secure because each branch is secure (assuming
secure programs with meta-variables cannot be made
insecure by applying substitutions) and the branches are
observationally equivalent. Since ζ is reflexive in the
PER model if restricted to secure programs and since
unification is only applied on secure programs, we use
the term unification under an equational theory in the
following.
The typing rules for other language primitives simply
propagate the transformations introduced when apply-
ing the rule for conditionals. For instance, a rule for
sequential composition could have the following form:2
C1 ↪→ C′1 C2 ↪→ C′2
C1;C2 ↪→ C′1;C′2
In summary, our approach proceeds in three steps:
1. lift a program by inserting meta-variables;
2. apply transforming typing rules to the lifted pro-
gram;
3. eliminate all remaining meta-variables.
The approach is not only parametric in the equational
theory under which branches are unified, but also in
where meta-variables are placed and how they may be
substituted. The latter two parameters determine, on the
one hand, how similar a transformed program is to the
original program and, on the other hand, limit the extent
to which insecure programs can be corrected.
Example 6 If one decides to insert meta-variables
between every two subcommands and to permit the sub-
stitution of meta-variables with arbitrary programs then
lifting P2 = if h then l := 1 else l := 0 results in
if h then (α1; l := 1;α2) else (α3; l := 0;α4).
An example for a unifier of the branches is the substitu-
tion {α1\l := 0, α2\,α3\, α4\l := 1}. Note that this is a
unifier under any equational theory as the instantiated
program has syntactically identical branches.
If one restricts the range of substitutions to sequences
of skip statements then a transformed program essen-
tially is a slowed-down version of the original program.
While this ensures that a transformed program more
closely resembles the original program, it also makes it
impossible to correct some programs like, e.g., P2. How-
ever,P4 = ifh then (skip; l := 1) else l := 1,which is insecure
in a multi-threaded setting (see Example 4), can still be
corrected to if h then (skip; l := 1) else (skip; l := 1).
2 Typing rules for other primitives that more actively contribute
to the transformation are possible, but outside the scope of this
paper. Here, the focus is on the elimination of inter-command
leaks involving if-then-else statements.
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If one relaxes the range of substitutions by allow-
ing meta-variables to be substituted with functions from
programs to programs then lifting P2 might lead to
if h then α1(l := 1) else α2(l := 0).
The two substitutions {α1\(λx.skip), α2\(λx.skip)} and
{α1\(λx.x), α2\(λx.l := 1)} are examples for unifiers of
the branches. Applying them results in the programs
if h then skip else skip and if h then l := 1 else l := 1, respec-
tively, which are both intuitively secure.
Generalizing the range of substitutions to functions
creates more flexibility for program transformations,
but it also results in more difficult unification problems
where higher-order unification is needed.
2.4 Preservation of program behavior
When eliminating information leaks in a given program,
one necessarily has to change the program’s behavior
in some way. In our approach such modifications are
caused by the insertion and the subsequent instantia-
tion of meta-variables. Whether one is able to correct a
given insecure program depends largely on how much
one is willing to modify the program’s semantics. This
trade-off is inherent in the problemofmaking a program
secure and not a peculiarity of our approach.
Example 7 P4 = if h then (skip; l := 1) else l := 1 leaks
information from high to low if the program executes
in a concurrent setting (see Example 4). The leak can be
eliminated by making the timing of the assignments in
the two branches identical. Possible corrections are, e.g.,
if h then (skip; l := 1) else (skip; l := 1) and if h then l := 1 else
l := 1.
P2 = if h then l := 1 else l := 0 leaks information from
high to low (see Example 1). In order to eliminate this
leak, more substantial changes to the program’s behav-
ior are needed. Possible corrections are if l′ then l := 1 else
l := 0, if h then l := 1 else l := 1, if h then (l := 1; l := 0) else
(l := 1; l := 0), and ifh then skip else skip.While thefirst three
corrections cause quite significant changes, the fourth
correction appears less problematic. Interestingly, this
correction has similar effects to executing the original
program under a dynamic information flow control that
skips the execution of statements at run time if their exe-
cution would cause illegitimate information flow [5].
These examples just illustrate the wide spectrum of
possible choices for defining in which sense a trans-
formed program must be equivalent to the original pro-
gram. Ultimately it depends on the application, how
flexible one is in dealing with the trade-off between
being able to correctmore insecureprograms andhaving
transformed programs that closely resemble the original
programs.
Hence, the question is not merelywhether one is will-
ing to change a given insecure program, but rather how
much one is willing to let a fully automatic transforma-
tion change the program in order to eliminate informa-
tion leaks. Specifying a range for substitutions andwhere
meta-variables may be placed does not yet provide an
adequate perspective for capturing how similar a trans-
formed program will be to the original program. Cap-
turing this by a notion of program equivalence appears
more natural. Here, we assume that the desired relation-
ship between a program and its transformation is given
by an equivalence relation . That is, C  C′ shall hold
for the original programC and the transformed program
C′. Alternatively, one could use simulation relations for
this purpose as in [1,14], for instance.
The focus of this article will be on notions of program
equivalence that permit differences in the timing behav-
ior within individual threads, but no other changes. This
makes corrections like the first one in Example 7 possi-
ble, but not the other corrections. While it appears dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to define program equivalences
that permit the latter corrections and that are also gen-
erally acceptable, this does not rule out the possibility
of defining a permissible program equivalence that is
appropriate for a particular application or a particular
program.
3 Instantiating the approach
We are now ready to illustrate how our approach can be
instantiated. We introduce a simple programming lan-
guage, a security policy, an observational equivalence
relation, and a notion of program equivalence to be pre-
served under the transformation.
3.1 Programming language
We adopt amulti-threadedwhile language (MWL) from
[14], which includes skip, assignments, conditionals,
loops, and a command for dynamic thread creation. The
set Com of commands is defined by
C :: = skip | Id := Exp | C1;C2 | if B then C1 else C2
| while B do C | fork(CV)
where V is a command vector in Com = ⋃n∈N Comn.
Expressions are variables, constants, or terms result-
ing from applying binary operators to expressions. A
state is amapping from variables in a given setVar to val-
ues in a given set Val. We use the judgment 〈|Exp, s|〉 ↓ n
Transformational typing and unification 113
for specifying that expression Exp evaluates to value n
in state s. Expression evaluation is assumed to be total
and to occur atomically. We say that expressions Exp
and Exp′ are equivalent (denoted by Exp≡Exp′) if and
only if they evaluate to identical values in each state,
i.e., ∀s ∈ S : ∀v ∈ Val : 〈|Exp, s|〉 ↓ v ⇔ 〈|Exp′, s|〉 ↓ v.
A configuration is a pair 〈|V, s|〉 where the vector V
specifies the threads that are currently active and s
defines the current state of the memory.
The operational semantics for MWL is formalized in
Figs. 1 and 2. Deterministic judgments have the form
〈|C, s|〉  〈|W, t|〉 expressing that command C performs a
computation step in state s, yielding a state t and a vector
of commands W, which has length zero if C terminated,
length one if it has neither terminated nor spawned any
threads, and length greater than one if new threads were
spawned. That is, a command vector of length n can be
viewed as a pool of n threads that run concurrently.Non-
deterministic judgments have the form 〈|V, s|〉  〈|V′, t|〉,
where V and V′ are thread pools, expressing that some
thread Ci in V performs a step in state s resulting in
the state t and some thread pool W′. The global thread
pool V′ results then by replacing Ci with W′. For sim-
plicity, we do not distinguish between commands and
command vectors of length one in the notation and use
the term program for referring to commands as well as
to command vectors.
In the following, we adopt the naming conventions
used above: s and t denote states, Exp denotes an
Fig. 1 Small-step nondeterministic semantics
Fig. 2 Small-step deterministic semantics
expression, B denotes a Boolean expression, C denotes
a command, and V and W denote command vectors.
3.2 Security policy and labelings
We assume a security policy that comprises two security
domains, a high level and a low level where the require-
ment is that no information flows from high to low. This
is the simplest policy for which the problem of infor-
mation flow security can be investigated. Each program
variable is associatedwith a security domain bymeans of
a labeling lab : Var → {low,high}. The intuition is that
values of low variables can be observed by the attacker
and, hence, should only be used to store public data.
High variables are used for storing secret data and their
contents are not observable for the attacker.
As mentioned before, h and l are used to denote high
variables and low variables, respectively. An expression
Exp has the security domain low (denoted byExp : low)
if all variables in Exp have domain low and, otherwise,
has security domain high (denoted by Exp : high). The
intuition is that values of expressions with domain high
possibly depend on secrets while values of low expres-
sions can only depend on public data.
3.3 Observational equivalence
We aim at securing programs against attackers who can
observe, in a given state, the values of low variables and,
in a program run, the values of low variables only in the
terminal state. That is, our attackers can neither observe
intermediate states in a run nor the duration of a run
(i.e., the timing behavior is not observable). The pro-
grams are meant to be executed in a concurrent setting,
in parallel with other threads, which implies that tim-
ing differences within alternative execution paths are
potentially dangerous (see Example 4).
The concurrent setting can be taken into account in
the definition of observational equivalence by pretend-
ing that the attacker were able to see the values of low
variables at any point during a program run. Such an
attacker can distinguish states s1 and s2 unless they are
low equal (denoted by s1 =L s2), i.e., if ∀var ∈ Var :
lab(var) = low ⇒ s1(var) = s2(var). Moreover, he
cannot distinguish two program runs that have equal
length and in which every two corresponding states are
low equal. For capturing this intuition, Sabelfeld and
Sands introduce the notion of a strong low
bisimulation.
Definition 1 ([14]) The strong low-bisimulation L is
the union of all symmetric relationsR on command vec-
tors V,V′ ∈ Com of equal size, i.e., V = 〈C1, . . . ,Cn〉
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and V′ = 〈C′1, . . . ,C′n〉, such that
∀s, s′, t∈ S : ∀i∈{1 . . . n} : ∀W ∈ Com:
[(VR V′ ∧ s =L s′ ∧ 〈|Ci, s|〉  〈|W, t|〉)
⇒ ∃W′ ∈ Com: ∃t′ ∈ S:(〈|C′i, s′|〉  〈|W′, t′|〉
∧ WR W′ ∧ t =L t′)]
The relation L ⊆ Com × Com defined by the rules
in Fig. 3 also captures this intuition. Moreover, this
relationship provides a syntactic approximation of the
strong bisimulation relation as programs that are related
by L are also strongly bisimilar. It is not difficult to see
that L is decidable if the equivalence of expressions
can be decided. Interestingly, a similar result also holds
for the strong low-bisimulation relation [4]. The rela-
tionL will serve us as observational equivalence in the
following.
Theorem 1 (Adequacy of L) If V L V′ is derivable
then V L V′ holds.
Fig. 3 A notion of observational equivalence
The proofs of this and all subsequent results are pro-
vided in Appendix A.
Remark 1 Note that it follows from Fig. 3 that L is
a partial equivalence relation, i.e., it is transitive and
symmetric, but not reflexive. For instance, l := h is not
L-related to itself because the precondition of [LA],
the only rule in Fig. 3 applicable to assignments to low
variables, rules out that high variables occur on the right
hand side of the assignment. Nevertheless, L is an
equivalence relation, even a congruence relation, if one
restricts programs to the language Slice that we define,
following [14], as the largest sub-language of Com with-
out assignments of high expressions to low variables,
assignments to high variables, and loops or conditionals
having high guards. The sub-language Slice provides the
context in which we will apply unification.
Similarly, L is only a partial equivalence relation.
For instance, the program l := h is not strongly low bi-
similar to itself. The argument is analogous to the one
in Example 2. If one runs the program in states s1 and
s2 with s1(l) = s2(l) = 0, s1(h) = 0, and s2(h) = 1 then
one obtains states that are not low equal. Again, L is
an equivalence if restricted to programs in Slice. unionsq
3.4 Program equivalence
We introduce an equivalence relation to constrain the
modifications caused by the transformation. Intuitively,
this relationship requires a transformed program to be
a slowed down version of the original program.
Definition 2 Theweak possibilistic bisimulation is the
union of all symmetric relations R on command vectors
such that whenever V R V′ then for all states s, t and all
vectors W there is a vector W′ such that
〈|V, s|〉  〈|W, t|〉 ⇒ (〈|V′, s|〉 ∗ 〈|W′, t|〉 ∧ WRW′)
and V = 〈〉 ⇒ 〈|V′, s|〉 ∗ 〈|〈〉, s|〉 .
The requirement that the transformed programmust be
-equivalent to the original program is stronger than
the requirement in [14]. There, it is only required that
the original program can simulate the transformed pro-
gram. One advantage of our more restrictive choice is
that a transformation cannot introduce nontermination.
4 Lifting a security type system
In this section we define a formal framework for
transforming programs by inserting and instantiating
meta-variables. Rather than developing an entirely new
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formalism from scratch, we adapt an existing transform-
ing type system from [14]. We show that any transfor-
mation within our framework is sound in the sense that
the output is secure and the behavior of the original
program is preserved in the sense of Definition 2.
4.1 Substitutions and liftings
We insertmeta-variables froma setV = {α1,α2, . . . } into
a program by sequential composition with its subterms.
The extension of MWL with meta-variables is denoted
by MWLV . The set ComV of commands in MWLV is
defined by3
C :: = skip | Id := Exp | C1;C2 | C;X | X;C
if B then C1 else C2 | while B do C | fork(CV) ,
where placeholders X,Y range over V . The set of all
command vectors inMWLV isComV =
⋃
n∈N(ComV )n.
Note that the ground programs in MWLV are exactly
the programs in MWL. The operational semantics for
ground programs remain unchanged, whereas programs
withmeta-variables are notmeant to be executed.Along
the same lines, we define the sets SliceV and SliceV ,
respectively, by insertingmeta-variables into commands
in Slice, and vectors thereof.
Meta-variables may be substituted with programs,
meta-variables, or the special symbol  that acts as the
neutral element of the sequential composition opera-
tor (“;”), i.e., ;C = C and C;  = C.4 When talking
about programs inComV under a given substitution, we
implicitly assume that these equations havebeenapplied
(from left to right) to eliminate the symbol  from the
program. Moreover, we view sequential composition as
an associative operator and implicitly identify programs
that differ only in the use of parentheses for sequen-
tial composition. That is, C1; (C2;C3) and (C1;C2);C3
denote the same program.
Definition 3 Amapping σ : V → ({} ∪ V ∪ ComV ) is a
substitution if its domain dom(σ ) = {α ∈ V | σ(α) = α}
is finite. The range of σ is defined as the set ran(σ ) =
σ(dom(σ )). A substitution mapping each meta-variable
in a program V to {} ∪ Com is a ground substitution of
V. A substitution π mapping all meta-variables in V to
 is a projection of V. Given a program V in Com, we
call every program V′ in ComV with πV′ = V a lifting
of V.
3 In the following, we overload notation by using C and V to
denote commands and command vectors in ComV (rather than in
Com), respectively.
4 Note that skip is not a neutral element of (“;”) as skip requires
a computation step.
Example 8 The program
if h then (α1; skip;α2; l := 1) else (α3; l := 1)
is a lifting of if h then (skip; l := 1) else l := 1. unionsq
In the remainder of this article, we will focus on substi-
tutions with a restricted range.
Definition 4 A substitution with range {} ∪ StutV is
called preserving, where StutV is defined by
C ::= X | skip | C1;C2
where the Ci range over StutV .
The term preserving substitution is justified by the fact
that such substitutions preserve a given program’s
semantics as specified in Definition 2.
Theorem 2 (Preservation of behavior)
1. For all preserving substitutions σ , ρ that are ground
for V ∈ ComV , we have σ(V)  ρ(V).
2. For each lifting V′ of a ground program V ∈ Com
and each preserving substitution σ with σ(V′)
ground, we have σ(V′)  V.
4.2 Unification of programs
The problem of finding a substitution that makes the
branches of conditionals with high guards observation-
ally equivalent can be viewed as the problem of finding
a unifier for the branches under the equational theory
L.5 To this end, we lift the relation L⊆ Com × Com
to a relation on ComV that we also denote by L.
Definition 5 V1,V2∈ComV are observationally equiva-
lent (V1 L V2) iff σV1 L σV2 holds for each preserv-
ing substitution σ that is ground for V1 and V2.
Definition 6 A L-unification problem ∆ is a finite set
of statements of the form Vi?LV′i , i.e.,
∆ = {V0?LV′0, . . . ,Vn?LV′n}
with Vi,V′i ∈ ComV for all i ∈ {0, . . . ,n}. A substitution
σ is a preserving unifier for ∆ if and only if σ is pre-
serving and σVi L σV′i holds for each i ∈ {0, . . . ,n}.
5 Note that we apply unification only to programs in the sub-lan-
guage SliceV , for which L constitutes a congruence relation (see
Remark 1).
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Fig. 4 A transforming
security type system for
programs with meta-variables
A L-unification problem is solvable if the set of pre-
serving unifiers U(∆) for ∆ is not empty.
4.3 A transforming type system
The transforming type system in Fig. 4 has been derived
from the one in [14]. We use the judgment
V ↪→ V′ : S
for denoting that the MWLV -program V can be trans-
formed into anMWLV -programV′. The intention is that
V′ has secure information flowand reflects the semantics
of V as specified by Definition 2. The slice S is a pro-
gram that is in the sub-language SliceV and describes the
timing behavior of V′.
The novelty over [14] is that our type system operates
on ComV (rather than on Com) and that the rule for
high conditionals has been altered. In the original type
system, a high conditional is transformedby sequentially
composing each branch with the slice of the respective
other branch. Instead of cross-copying slices, our rule
instantiates themeta-variables occurring in the branches
using preserving unifiers. The advantages of this modifi-
cation are discussed in Sect. 6.Note that the rule [Condh]
does notmandate the choice of a specific preserving uni-
fier of the branches. Nevertheless, we can prove that the
type system meets our previously described intuition
about the judgmentV ↪→ V′ : S. To this end, we employ
Sabelfeld and Sands’s [13] strong security condition for
defining what it means for a program to have secure
information flow. Many other definitions are possible
(see e.g., [12]).
Definition 7 A program V ∈ Com is strongly secure if
and only if V L V holds. A program V ∈ ComV is
strongly secure if and only if σV is strongly secure for
each substitution σ that is preserving and ground for V.
In the following, we use V  V′ (where V,V′ ∈
ComV) as abbreviation for: σV  σV′ holds for every
substitution σ that is preserving and ground for V and
for V′.
Theorem 3 (Soundness of the type system)
If V ↪→ V′ : S can be derived then
1. V′ has secure information flow,
2. V  V′ holds, and
3. V′ L S holds.
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of
Theorems 2 and 3. It shows that lifting a program and
then applying the transforming type system preserves a
program’s behavior in the desired way.
Corollary 1 If V∗ ↪→ V′ : S is derivable for some lifting
V∗ ∈ ComV of a program V ∈ Com then V′ has secure
information flow and V  V′.
5 Automating the transformation
In Sect. 4, we have shown our type system to be
sound for any choice of liftings and preserving unifi-
ers in the applications of rule [Condh]. For automating
the transformation, we have to define more concretely
where meta-variables are inserted and how unifiers are
determined.
5.1 Automatic insertion of meta-variables
When lifting a program, one is faced with a trade off:
inserting meta-variables means to create possibilities
for correcting the program, but it also increases the
complexity of the unification problem. Within this spec-
trumour objective is tominimize the number of inserted
meta-variables without losing the possibility of correct-
ing the program. To this end, consider the sub-language
PadV , the extension of StutV with assignments to high
variables, which is defined by the following grammar:
C ::= X | skip | Idh := Exp | C1;C2
Here X is a placeholder for meta-variables in V , Idh is
a placeholder for program variables in Var with domain
high, andC1,C2 areplaceholders for commands inPadV .
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Observe that two programs C1 and C2 in PadV
are related via L whenever they contain the same
number of constants, i.e., skips and assignments to high
variables (denoted as const(C1) = const(C2)), and the
same number of occurrences of each meta-variable α
(denoted by |C1|α = |C2|α). The positioning of assign-
ments andmeta-variableswithin theprograms, however,
is irrelevant.
Lemma 1 For two commands C1 and C2 in PadV we
have C1 L C2 if and only if const(C1) = const(C2) and
∀α ∈ V : |C1|α = |C2|α .
Moreover, observe that inserting one meta-variable
next to another does not create new possibilities for cor-
recting a program. This, together with Lemma 1, implies
that inserting one meta-variable into every subprogram
within PadV is sufficient for allowing every possible
correction.
We use this insight to define the language MglV of
most general liftings. It is the sub-language of ComV
that contains all liftings of programs in Com in which
the rightmost subterm of every sub-program in PadV is
a (unique) meta-variable. A technical side-effect of the
definition of MglV is the fact that it greatly simplifies
inductive proofs.
Definition 8 The language MglV is the subset of com-
mands given by the following grammar, in which every
meta-variable occurs at most once.
L ::= P | P; Idl := Exp;L | P; if B then L1 else L2;L
| P;while B do L1;L | P; fork(L1V);L
Here Idl is a placeholder for program variables in Var
with domain low, L,L1,L2 are placeholders for com-
mands inMglV ,V is a placeholder for a command vector
in MglV , and P is a placeholder for a command of the
form X or of the form C;X with C ∈ PadV .
The liftings in MglV are most general in the sense that if
two programs can be made observationally equivalent
for some lifting then they can be made equivalent for
any lifting chosen from MglV .
Lemma 2 Let Vi ∈ Com, with liftings V′i ∈ ComV and
V∗i ∈ MglV for i = 1, 2. Suppose V∗1 (V∗2 ) shares nometa-
variables with V′1, V
′
2, and V
∗
2 (V
′
1, V
′
2, and V
∗
1 ). Then we
have
U({V′1?LV′2}) = ∅ implies U({V∗1?LV∗2 }) = ∅
The calculus ⇀: Com → ComV turns the choice of
a lifting in MglV into an algorithm. The mapping is
Fig. 5 A calculus for computing most general liftings
defined inductively: a freshmeta-variable is sequentially
composed to the right hand side of each subprogram.
Another fresh meta-variable is sequentially composed
to the left hand side of each assignment to a low variable,
fork, while loop, or conditional. A lifting of a sequen-
tially composed program is computed by sequentially
composing the liftings of the subprograms while remov-
ing the terminal variable of the left program. The full
calculus is given in Fig. 5.
Example 9 Applying the lifting calculus to the program
C = h1 := 1;h2 := 1; l := 0;h3 := 2 results in the lifted pro-
gram C = h1 := 1;h2 := 1;α1; l := 0;h3 := 2;α2. The pro-
gramC contains substantially fewermeta-variables than
the program obtained by naive insertion of meta-vari-
ables between every two subprograms. However, it still
allows for every possible correction, as we show in the
subsequent lemma.
The liftings computed by ⇀ are most general in the
sense of Lemma 2.
Lemma 3 Let V ∈ Com and V ∈ ComV . If V ⇀ V can
be derived, then
1. V is a lifting of V and
2. V ∈ MglV .
Putting Lemmas 2 and 3 together, we can prove the
completeness of the calculus ⇀: if two programs can be
made observationally equivalent for some choice of lif-
tings, then they can also bemade equivalent if we restrict
ourselves to the liftings computed by ⇀.
Theorem 4 Let Vi ∈ Com with liftings V′i ,Vi ∈ ComV
for i = 1, 2. Suppose V1 (V2) shares no meta-variables
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with V′1, V
′
2, and V2 (V
′
1, V
′
2, and V1). If V1 ⇀ V1 and
V2 ⇀ V2 can be derived, then
U({V′1?LV′2}) = ∅ implies U({V1?LV2}) = ∅ .
Theorem 4 shows that the lifting calculus reduces the
number of inserted meta-variables without losing solu-
tions. However, the theorem has not yet the form that
we will need for proving the completeness of the entire
automation (see Sect. 5.3) because the preconditions of
the theorem do not hold if one chooses V′1 = V′2 (dis-
jointness of meta-variables is violated for non-ground
programs). This is why we need another, slightly differ-
ent completeness result for the lifting calculus.
Theorem 5 Let V′,V ∈ ComV be liftings of V ∈ Com.
Suppose V shares no meta-variables with V′ and V ⇀ V
can be derived. Then
U({V′?LV′}) = ∅ implies U({V?LV}) = ∅.
Theorem 5 shows that if a program can be repaired for
some lifting (recall that if a program is L-equivalent to
itself, then it is also secure) then it can also be repaired
if we restrict ourselves to the lifting computed by ⇀.
5.2 Automating unification
Integrating standard unification algorithms Stan-
dard algorithms for the unification modulo an associa-
tive and commutative operatorwith neutral element and
constants (see, e.g., [3] for background information on
AC1 unification) build on a characterization of equal-
ity that is equivalent to the one in Lemma 1. This cor-
respondence allows one to employ existing algorithms
for AC1-unification problems with constants and free
function symbols (like, e.g., the one in [7]) to the uni-
fication problems that arise when applying the rule for
conditionals and then to filter the output such that only
preserving substitutions remain.6
On most general unifiers When applying our transfor-
mational type system to programs with nested high con-
ditionals, the rule [Condh] is applied iteratively.
When choosing a unifier of the branches, care must be
taken in order not to rule out possible corrections in
future applications of the rule [Condh]. A natural way
6 For the reader familiar with AC1 unification: In the language
StutV one views  as the neutral element, skip as the constant,
and ; as the operator. Other language constructs, i.e., assignments,
conditionals, loops, forks, and ; (outside the language StutV ) must
be treated as free constructors.
to avoid this pitfall is to use a most general unifier, i.e.,
a unifier that can be specialized to every other unifier.
Unfortunately,AC1-unificationproblemswith constants
do, in general, not allow for most general unifiers [3].
This result carries over to the theory L.
Example 10 The substitutions η1 = {α1\,α2\skip} and
η2 = {α1\skip,α2\} both solve the unification problem
∆ = {α1;α2?Lskip}. In fact, every possible solution of ∆
must be ground for α1;α2, so there can be no unifier σ
with substitutions ρ1 and ρ2 such that η1 = ρ1 ◦ σ and
η2 = ρ2 ◦σ hold. In other words, no most general unifier
exists for ∆.
As in AC1-unification problems with constants, the role
of most general unifiers for L can be replaced by the
more general notion of a complete set of unifiers. For a
given unification problem ∆, a complete set of unifiers
is a set Σ ⊆ U(∆) such that for every unifier σ ∈ U(∆),
there is a substitution ρ and a η ∈ Σ such that σ = ρη.
Minimal complete sets of unifiers can be computed and
used for transformational typing. To avoid backtracking
in the search, such a type system could return an entire
set of transformed commands. Typing a high conditional
then amounts to computing a complete set of unifiers for
each combination of a command from the set returned
for the then-branch with a command returned for the
else-branch. Each unifier is then applied to the respec-
tive pair, resulting in a set of possible transformations
for the high conditional. The transformational typing
process succeeds, if the set of possible transformations
of a program is not empty. Otherwise, the program is
rejected as incorrectable. Fortunately, we can avoid this
explosion in complexity by using a more problem-tai-
lored unification algorithm.
A problem-tailored solution We next present a unifi-
cation algorithm that makes use of our additional infor-
mation on the positions of the inserted meta-variables
and the limited range of preserving substitutions. Recall
that we operate on programs in SliceV , i.e., on programs
without assignments to high variables, without assign-
ments of high expressions to low variables, and without
loops or conditionals having high guards.
The unification algorithm in Fig. 6 is given in form
of a calculus for judgments of the form C1?LC2 :: η,
meaning that η is a preserving unifier of the commands
C1 andC2. The operative intuition behind the algorithm
is to scan two program terms from left to right and dis-
tinguish two cases: if both leftmost subcommands are
free constructors, (low assignments, loops, conditionals
and forks) they are compared and, if they agree, uni-
fication is recursively applied to pairs of corresponding
subprograms and the residual programs (see rules [Asg],
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Fig. 6 Unification calculus
[Whl], [Ite], and [Frk]). If one leftmost subcommand is
skip, both programs are decomposed into their maximal
initial subprograms in StutV and the remaining program
(see rule [Seq4]).7 The rule [Seq3] can then be applied
to the remainders, and separates the initial free con-
structors from the programs that are sequentially com-
posed to their right hand side. Recursive decomposition
eventually leads to unification problems on StutV . The
rule [Seq2] removes initial skips, while the rules [Var1],
[Var2], [Seq1], and [Seq′1] govern how basic unifiers are
constructed. Note that the unifiers obtained from recur-
sive application of the algorithm to sub-programs are
combined by set union, which is admissible if the meta-
variables in all subprograms are disjoint.
Lemma 4 Let V1,V2 ∈ SliceV where no meta-variable
occurs more than once in (V1,V2). If V1?LV2 :: η, then
1. η ∈ U({V1?LV2}), and
2. η is idempotent, and
3. dom(η) ∪ var(ran(η)) ⊆ var(V1) ∪ var(V2), and
4. V1,V2 ∈ MglV implies ηV1, ηV2 ∈ MglV ,
where var(·) returns the set of meta-variables occurring
in a set of commands in ComV .
As Property 2 of Lemma 4 shows, the unifiers η com-
putedbyour calculus are idempotent, i.e., η◦η = η holds.
Together with the assumption that every meta-variable
occurs at most once in (V1,V2), Property 3 is the reason
why unifiers may be combined using set union. Property
4 of Lemma 4 is a substitute for the existence of most
general unifiers as, in combination with Lemma 2, it
implies that we do not lose the possibility for subsequent
corrections by applying the unifiers computed with our
calculus. This fact allows us to prove the completeness of
our transformational approach in the following section.
7 Formally,wedefine the languageNSeqV of commands inSliceV\{skip}without sequential composition as a top-level operator. The
language NStutV is the set of commands in SliceV given by the
grammar C ::= C1;C2, where C1 ∈ NSeqV and C2 ∈ SliceV .
5.3 Completeness
In the following we show the completeness of our
approach, in the sense that every program that can be
repaired by a process of inserting skip commands at arbi-
trary positions in the program can also be repaired by
our method. In other words, by first applying the lifting
calculus from Fig. 5 and then applying the transforming
type system of Fig. 4, where unification is instantiated
with the algorithm in Fig. 6, we do not lose any possible
corrections. In particular, our approach is complete with
respect to applying the transformational type system to
arbitrary liftings and instantiating it with an unification
algorithm of choice.
Theorem 6 (Completeness) Let V ∈ Com, V,W ∈
ComV , W be a lifting of V, and V ⇀ V.
1. If there is a preserving substitution σ with σW L
σW, then V ↪→′ V′ : S for some V′,S ∈ ComV .
2. If W ↪→ W′ : S for some W′,S ∈ ComV then V ↪→′
V′ : S′ for some V′,S′ ∈ ComV .
Here, the judgment V ↪→′ V′ : S denotes a success-
ful transformation of V to V′ by the transformational
type system, where the precondition σ ∈ U({S1?LS2})
is replaced by S1?LS2 :: σ in rule [Condh].
6 Discussion
Sections 3, 4 and 5 made our novel approach to trans-
formational typing concrete in the context of a multi-
threaded programming language. In the following, we
show that this instance compares favorably with the
cross-copying technique. As outlined in Sect. 1.3, there
are several variants of this technique, some of them
being suitable for concurrent languages. In our compar-
ison, we focus on the version of cross-copying for a con-
current language as proposed in [14]. The later version
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in [11] constitutes a slight improvement regarding the
introduction of non-termination, but this problem does
not even occur in our setting. More recent proposals
(like, e.g., [2]) aim at sequential languages, and it is not
clear how they could be adapted to a concurrent setting.
6.1 Comparison
The type system introduced in Sect. 4 is capable of
analyzing programs where assignments to low variables
appear in the branches of conditionals with high guards,
which is not possible with the type system in [14].
Example 11 If one lifts
C = if h1 then (h2 := Exp1; l := Exp2) else (l := Exp2),
where Exp2 : low, using our lifting calculus, applies
our transforming type system, and finally removes all
remaining meta-variables by applying a projection then
this results in
if h1 then (h2 := Exp1; l := Exp2) else (skip; l := Exp2),
a program that is strongly secure and also weakly bisim-
ilar to C. Note that the program C cannot be repaired
by applying the type system from [14] as assignments to
low variables occur in the branches.
Another advantageof ourunification-basedapproach
in comparison to the cross-copying technique is that the
resulting programs are faster and smaller in size.
Example 12 The program
if h then (h1 := Exp1) else (h2 := Exp2)
is returned unmodified by our type system, while the
type system from [14] transforms it into the bigger
program
if h then (h1 := Exp1; skip) else (skip;h2 := Exp2).
If one applies this type systema second time, one obtains
an even bigger program, namely
if h then (h1 := Exp1; skip; skip; skip)
else (skip; skip; skip;h2 := Exp2).
In contrast, our type system realizes a transformation
that is idempotent, i.e., the program resulting from the
transformation remains unmodified under a second
application of the transformation. This property turns
out to be helpful in the context of multi-level security
policies (see Sect. 6.2).
The chosen instantiation of our approach preserves the
program behavior in the sense of a weak bisimulation.
Naturally, one can correct more programs if one is will-
ing to relax this relationship between input andoutput of
the transformation. For this reason, there are also some
programs that cannot be corrected with our type system
although they can be corrected with the type system
in [14] (which assumes a weaker relationship between
input and output).
Example 13 if h then (while l do (h1 := Exp)) else (h2 := 1)
is rejected by our type system. The type system in [14]
transforms it into the strongly secure program
if h then (while l do (h1 := Exp); skip)
else (while l do (skip);h2 := 1).
Note that this program is not weakly bisimilar to the
original program as the cross-copying of the while loop
introduces possible non-termination.
If one wishes to permit such transformations, one could,
for instance, choose a simulation instead of the weak
bisimulation in a variant of our approach. This would
allow for an extended range of substitutions beyond
StutV . For instance, for correcting the program in
Example 13, one would need to instantiate a meta-vari-
able with a while loop. We are confident that, in such a
setting, using our approach would even further broaden
the scope of corrections while retaining the advantage
of transformed programs that are comparably small and
fast. It is not clear to us yet, however, how the concurrent
version of cross-copying from [11] could be simulated in
our approach.
6.2 Multi-level security policies
Non-transforming security type systems for the two-
level security policy can even be used to analyze pro-
grams under a policy with more domains. To this end,
one performs multiple type checks where each pass
ensures that no illegitimate information flow can occur
into a designated domain. For instance, consider a three-
domain policy with domains D = {top, left, right}, where
information may only flow from left and from right to
top. To analyze a program under this policy, one con-
siders all variables with label top and left as if labeled
high in a first type check (ensuring that there is no ille-
gitimate information flow to right) and, in a second type
check, considers all variables with label top and right
as if labeled high. There is no need for a type check
from the perspective of top as all information may flow
to top. When adopting this approach for transforming
type systems, one must take into account that the guar-
antees established by the type check for one domain
might not be preserved under the modifications caused
by the transformation for another domain. Therefore,
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oneneeds to iterate theprocess until a fixpoint is reached
for all security domains.8
Example 14 For the three-level policy from above, the
program if t then (t := t′; r := r′; l := l′) else (r := r′; l := l′)
(assuming t, t′ : top, r, r′ : right and l, l′ : left) is lifted to
if t then (t := t′; r := r′;α1; l := l′;α2) else (r := r′;α3; l := l′;α4)
and transformed into
if t then (t := t′; r := r′; l := l′)
else (r := r′; skip; l := l′)
when analyzing security w.r.t. an observer with domain
left. Lifting for right then results in
if t then (t := t′;α1; r := r′; l := l′;α2)
else (α3; r := r′; skip; l := l′;α4).
Unification and projection gives
if t then (t := t′; r := r′; l := l′; skip)
else (skip; r := r′; skip; l := l′)
Observe that this program is not secure any more from
the viewpoint of a left-observer. Applying the trans-
formation again for domain left results in the secure
program
if t then (t := t′; r := r′; skip; l := l′; skip)
else (skip; r := r′; skip; l := l′; skip),
which is a fixpoint of both transformations.
Note that the idempotence of the transformation is nec-
essary (but not sufficient) for the existence of a fixpoint
and, hence, for the termination of such an iterative
approach. As is illustrated in Example 12, the trans-
formation realized by our type system is idempotent,
whereas the transformation from [14] is not.
Another possibility to tackle multi-level security pol-
icies in our setting is to unify the branches of a condi-
tional with guard of security level D′ under the theory⋂
D ≥D′ D. This would result in a multi-level, trans-
forming security type system that supports a single-pass
transformation. However, an investigation of this possi-
bility remains to be done.
7 Conclusions
We proposed a novel approach to analyzing the security
of information flow in concrete programs with the help
of transforming security type systemswhere the key idea
has been to integrate unification with typing rules. This
8 Transforming a program in multiple passes would not be neces-
sary if amulti-level versionof the given type systemwere available.
However,multi-level versions do not exist so far for contemporary
transforming security type systems.
yielded a very natural perspective on the problem of
eliminating inter-command information leakage.
We instantiated our approach by defining a program
equivalence that captures the behavioral equivalence to
be preserved during the transformation and an obser-
vational equivalence that captures the perspective of a
low-level attacker. This led to a novel transforming secu-
rity type system and calculi for automatically inserting
meta-variables into programs and for computing sub-
stitutions. We proved that the resulting analysis tech-
nique is sound and also provided a completeness result.
The main advantages of our approach include that the
precision of type checking is improved, that additional
insecure programs can be corrected, that the resulting
programs are faster and smaller in size, and that it offers
the possibility to analyze programs under security poli-
cies with more than two security domains.
It will be interesting to see how our approach per-
forms for other choices of the parameters like, e.g.,
observational equivalences that admit intentional
declassification [9]. Another interesting possibility is to
perform the entire information flow analysis and
program transformation using unification without any
typing rules, which would mean to further explore the
possibilities of the PERmodel. Finally, it would be desir-
able to integrate our fully automatic transformation into
an interactive framework for supporting the program-
mer in correcting insecure programs as sketched in the
introduction.
Acknowledgments We thank the anonymous reviewers for valu-
able comments. We also thank Daniel Hedin and Paul Hankes
Drielsma for their feedback to this and earlier versions of the
article.
A Proofs of the Technical Results
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1 If V L V′ is derivable then V L V′ holds.
Before proving Theorem 1, we introduce a lemma
and prove it using the bisimulation-up-to technique.
Definition 9 A binary relation R on commands is a
strong low bisimulation up to L if R is symmetric and
∀C,C′,C1, . . . ,Cn ∈ Com: ∀s, s′, t ∈ S:
(C R C′ ∧ s =L s′ ∧ 〈|C, s|〉  〈|C1 . . .Cn, t|〉)
⇒∃C′1, . . . ,C′n ∈ Com: ∃t′ ∈ S: (〈|C′, s′|〉  〈|C′1 . . .C′n, t′|〉
∧ ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} : Ci(R∪ L)+C′i ∧ t =L t′)
Theorem 7 If R is a strong low bisimulation up to L
then R ⊆L holds.
122 B. Köpf, H. Mantel
Proof (Sketch) Define Q = ((R ∪ L)↑)+ where +
returns the transitive closure of a relation and ↑ returns
the pointwise lifting of a relation on commands to com-
mand vectors (here, R∪ L is viewed as a relation on
commands). We obtain Q ⊆L from the fact that Q
satisfies the implication in Definition 1 (replacing R in
the definition by Q).
The implication can be proved by a straightforward
induction over the Q-distance between two Q-related
programs V and V′, where the Q-distance between V
and V′ is the minimal length of a sequence V1, . . . ,Vn
with the properties ∀i ∈ {0, . . . ,n} : Vi (R ∪ L)↑ Vi+1,
V0 = V, and Vn+1 = V′. Such a sequence exists because
V Q V′ holds. We obtain R ⊆L from R ⊆ Q (by
definition of Q) and the transitivity of ⊆. unionsq
Lemma 5
1. If Id : high then skip L Id := Exp.
2. IfExp,Exp′ : lowandExp ≡ Exp′ then Id := Exp L
Id := Exp′.
3. If C1 L C′1 and C2 L C
′
2 then C1;C2 L C
′
1;C
′
2.
4. If C1 L C′1 and V2 L V
′
2 then fork(C1V2) L
fork(C′1V
′
2).
5. If B,B′ : low, B ≡ B′, and C1 L C′1 then
while B do C1 L while B′ do C′1.
6. If B,B′ : low, B ≡ B′, C1 L C′1, and C2 L C′2 then
if B then C1 else C2 L if B′ then C′1 else C
′
2.
7. If C1 L C′1 and C1 L C
′
2 then
skip;C1 L if B′ then C′1 else C
′
2.
Proof We illustrate the proof idea with three example
cases. In each case, we prove the strong low bisimilarity
of the two commands with the bisimulation up-to tech-
nique. That is, we define a binary relation R on com-
mands that relates the two commands and prove that
R is a strong low bisimulation up to L. From Theo-
rem 7, we then obtain that the two given commands are
strongly low bisimilar.
1. Define R as the symmetric closure of the relation
{(skip, Id := Exp) | Id : high}. Let (skip, Id := Exp) ∈
R and s, s′ ∈ S be arbitrary with s =L s′. From the
operational semantics, we obtain 〈|skip, s|〉  〈|〈〉, s|〉.
Moreover, there is a t′ ∈ S such that 〈|Id := Exp, s′|〉 
〈|〈〉, t′|〉. From s =L s′ and Id : high, we obtain s =L t′.
Let (Id := Exp, skip) ∈ R and s, s′, t ∈ S be arbitrary
with s =L s′ and 〈|Id := Exp, s|〉  〈|〈〉, t|〉. We have
〈|skip, s′|〉  〈|〈〉, s′|〉. From s =L s′ and Id : high, we
obtain t =L s′.
Hence, R is a strong low bisimulation up to L.
2. DefineR as the symmetric relation {(C1;C2,C′1;C′2) |
C1 L C′1,C2 L C
′
2}.
Let (C1;C2,C′1;C
′
2) ∈ R and s, s′, t ∈ S be arbitrary
with s =L s′ and 〈|C1;C2, s|〉  〈|C∗, t|〉 for some C∗ ∈
Com. We make a case distinction on C∗ according
to the operational semantics:
(a) C∗ = C2: From the operational semantics, we
obtain 〈|C1, s|〉  〈|〈〉, t|〉. Since C1 L C′1 and
s =L s′, there is a t′ ∈ S with 〈|C′1, s′|〉  〈|〈〉, t′|〉
and t =L t′ according toDefinition 1. From the
operational semantics,weobtain 〈|C′1;C′2, s′|〉 〈|C′2, t′|〉withC2 L C′2 (by definition of R) and
t =L t′.
(b) C∗ = 〈C;C2〉V for some C ∈ Com and V ∈
Com (possibly V = 〈〉). From the operational
semantics, we obtain 〈|C1, s|〉  〈|〈C〉V, t|〉. Since
C1 L C′1 and s =L s′, there are C′ ∈ Com,
V′ ∈ Com, and t′ ∈ Swith 〈|C′1, s′|〉 〈|〈C′〉V′, t′|〉,
C L C′,V L V′, and t =L t′. From the oper-
ational semantics, we obtain 〈|C′1;C′2, s′|〉 〈|〈C′;C′2〉V′, t′|〉 with (C;C2,C′;C′2) ∈ R (fol-
lows from C L C′, C2 L C′2, and the def-
inition of R), V L V′, and t =L t′.
Hence, R is a strong low bisimulation up to L.
3. Define R as the symmetric relation
{ (if B then C1 else C2, if B′ then C′1 else C′2)| B,B′ : low,B ≡ B′,C1 L C′1,C2 L C′2}
Let (if B then C1 else C2, if B′ then C′1 else C
′
2) ∈ R
and s, s′ ∈ S be arbitrary with s =L s′. We make a
case distinction on the value of B in s:
(a) 〈|B, s|〉 ↓ False: From s =L s′, B,B′ : low, and
B ≡ B′, we obtain 〈|B′, s′|〉 ↓ False. From the
operational semantics, we obtain 〈|ifB then
C1 else C2, s|〉  〈|C2, s|〉 and 〈|if B′ then C′1 else
C′2, s′|〉  〈|C′2, s′|〉 with s =L s′. By definition of
R, we have C2 L C′2.
(b) 〈|B, s|〉 ↓ True: From s =L s′,B,B′ : low, andB ≡
B′, we obtain 〈|B′, s′|〉 ↓ True. From the opera-
tional semantics, we obtain 〈|if B then C1 else
C2, s|〉  〈|C1, s|〉 and 〈|if B′ then C′1 else C′2, s′|〉 〈|C′1, s′|〉 with s =L s′. By definition of R, we
have C1 L C′1.
Hence, R is a strong low bisimulation up to L. unionsq
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1 The proof proceeds by induction
on the number of rule applications in the derivation D
of V L V′.
Base case: D consists of only a single rule application.
We make a case distinction on this rule.
[Skip] The judgment derived is skip L skip.
Lemma 5(1) implies skip L h := h where h is an
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arbitrary variable with h : high. From symmetry and
transitivity of L, we obtain skip L skip.
[SHA1] The judgment derived is skip L Id := Exp
with Id : high. From Lemma 5(1) follows
skip L Id := Exp.
[SHA2] The judgment derived is Id := Exp L skip
with Id : high. From Lemma 5(1) and the symmetry of
L, we obtain Id := Exp L skip.
[HA] The judgment derived is Id := Exp L Id′ :=
Exp′ with Id, Id′ : high. From Lemma 5(1), we obtain
skip L Id := Exp and skip L Id′ := Exp′. Symmetry
and transitivity of L imply Id := Exp L Id′ := Exp′.
[LA]The judgment derived is Id := Exp L Id := Exp′
with Id : low, Exp,Exp′ : low, and Exp ≡ Exp′.
Lemma 5(2) implies Id := Exp L Id := Exp′.
Induction assumption: If D′ is a derivation of W L
W′ with fewer rule applications than inD thenW L W′
holds.
Step case: We make a case distinction depending on
the rule applied at the root of D.
[SComp] The judgment derived is C1;C2 L C′1;C′2
and there are derivations D1 and D2 of C1 L C′1 and
C2 L C′2, respectively. From the induction assumption,
we obtainC1 L C′1 andC2 L C
′
2. Lemma 5(3) implies
C1;C2 L C′1;C
′
2.[PComp] The judgment derived is
〈C1, . . . ,Cn〉 L 〈C′1, . . . ,C′n〉
and there are derivationsDi ofCi L C′i for i = 1, . . . ,n.
From the induction assumption, we obtain Ci L C′i
for i = 1, . . . ,n. From Definition 1, we obtain 〈C1, . . . ,
Cn〉 L 〈C′1, . . . ,C′n〉.[Fork] The judgment derived is fork(C1V1) L
fork(C′1V
′
1) and there are derivationsD1 andD2 ofC1 L
C′1 and V1 L V
′
1, respectively. From the induction
assumption, we obtain C1 L C′1 and V1 L V
′
1.
Lemma 5(4) implies fork(C1V1) L fork(C′1V
′
1).[WL] The judgment derived is
while B do C1 L while B′ do C′1
with B,B′ : low, B ≡ B′, and there is a derivation D1 of
C1LC′1. Lemma 5(5) implies then thatwhile B do C1L
while B′ do C′1.[LIte] The judgment derived is
if B then C1 else C2 L if B′ then C′1 else C
′
2
with B,B′ : low, B ≡ B′, and there are derivations
D1 and D2 of C1 L C′1 and C2 L C′2, respectively.
Lemma 5(6) implies if B then C1 else C2 L if B′ then C′1
else C′2.[SHIte1] The judgment derived is
skip;C1 L if B′ then C′1 else C
′
2
with B′ : high and there are derivations D1 and D2 of
C1 L C′1 and C1 L C
′
2, respectively. From the induc-
tion assumption, we obtain C1 L C′1 and C1 L C
′
2.
Lemma 5(7) implies skip;C1 L If B′ then C′1 else C
′
2.[SHIte2] The judgment derived is
if B then C1 else C2 L skip;C′1
with B : high and there are derivations D1 and D2 of
C1 L C′1 and C2 L C
′
1, respectively. From the induc-
tion assumption, we obtain C1 L C′1 and C2 L C
′
1.
Symmetry of L and Lemma 5(7) imply skip;C′1 L
if B then C1 else C2. From the symmetry of L, we obtain
if B then C1 else C2 L skip;C′1.[HAHIte1] The judgment derived is
Id := Exp;C1 L if B′ then C′1 else C
′
2
with Id : high, B′ : high, and there are derivations D1
and D2 of C1 L C′1 and C1 L C′2, respectively. From
skip;C1 L if B′ then C′1 else C
′
2 (see Case [SHIte1]),
Id := Exp;C1 L skip;C1 (see Case [SHA2]), and transi-
tivity of L, we obtain Id := Exp;C1 L if B′ then C′1 else
C′2.[HAHIte2] The judgment derived is if B then C1 else
C2 L Id′ := Exp′;C′1 with Id
′ : high, B : high, and
there are derivations D1 and D2 of C1 L C′1 and
C2 L C′1, respectively. From if B then C1 else C2 L
skip;C′1 (see Case [SHIte2]), skip;C′1 L Id′ := Exp′;C′1
(see Case [SHA1]), and transitivity of L, we obtain
if B then C1 else C2 L Id′ := Exp′;C′1.[HIte] The judgment derived is if B then C1 else C2 L
if B′ then C′1 else C
′
2 with B,B
′ : high and there are der-
ivations D1, D2, and D3 of C1 L C′1, C1 L C′2, and
C1 L C2, respectively. From the induction assumption,
we obtain C1 L C′1, C1 L C
′
2, and C1 L C2. Sym-
metry and transitivity of L implies C1 L C1. From
if B then C1 else C2 L skip;C1 (see Case [SHIte2]),
skip;C1 L if B′ then C′1 else C
′
2 (see Case [SHIte1]), and
transitivity of L, we then obtain if B then C1 else C2 L
if B′ then C′1 else C
′
2. unionsq
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2
1. For all preserving substitutions σ , ρ that are ground
for V ∈ ComV , we have σ(V)  ρ(V).
2. For each lifting V′ of a ground program V ∈ Com
and each preserving substitution σ with σ(V′)
ground, we have σ(V′)  V.
For the proof of Theorem 2 we first strengthen our
notion of bisimulation. Then we prove a lemma that
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shows that this relation is a congruence by using the
up-to technique.
Definition 10 The pointwise weak possibilistic bisimu-
lation ˙ is the union of all symmetric relations R on
command vectors V,V′ ∈ Com of equal size, i.e., V =
〈C1, . . . ,Cn〉,V′ = 〈C′1, . . . ,C′n〉, such that whenever
VRV′ then for all states s, t and all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} and
all thread pools W there is a thread pool W′ with
〈|Ci, s|〉  〈|W, t|〉 ⇒ (〈|C′i, s|〉 ∗ 〈|W′, t|〉 ∧ WR W′)
and V = 〈〉 ⇒ 〈|V′, s|〉 →∗ 〈|〈〉, s|〉. (1)
Observe that Property 1 also holds for the entire relation
˙. Furthermore, for two thread pools V = 〈C1, . . . ,Cn〉,
V′ = 〈C′1, . . . ,C′n〉 we have V ˙ V′ if and only if for all
i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} we have Ci ˙ C′i.
Lemma 6 V ˙ V′ ⇒ V  V′
Proof Follows directly from Definitions 2 and 10 and
the operational semantics for thread pools. unionsq
Definition 11 A binary relation R on commands is a
pointwise weak possibilistic bisimulation up to ˙ if R is
symmetric and
∀C,C′,C1, . . . ,Cn ∈ Com: ∀s, t ∈ S:
(C R C′ ∧ 〈|C, s|〉  〈|C1 . . .Cn, t|〉)
⇒∃C′1, . . . ,C′n ∈ Com: (〈|C′, s|〉 ∗ 〈|C′1 . . .C′n, t|〉
∧ ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} : Ci(R∪ ˙)C′i).
Theorem 8 If R is a pointwise weak possibilistic bisimu-
lation up to ˙, then we have R⊆˙.
Proof Let Q = (R∪ ˙)↑, where ↑ returns the point-
wise lifting of a relation on commands to command
vectors (here, R∪ ˙ is viewed as a relation on com-
mands). It is sufficient to show Q ⊆˙. To this end,
we show that Q satisfies the condition in Definition 10,
and is therefore contained in ˙, the union of all such
relations. Let V = 〈C1, . . . ,Cn〉 and V′ = 〈C′1, . . . ,C′n〉
and (V,V′) ∈ Q. If n = 0, then we have V =V′ = 〈〉
and the second condition of Definition 10 is fulfilled.
Suppose n > 0 and 〈|V, s|〉  〈|W, t|〉. By definition of
the operational semantics, we know that there is i ∈
{1, . . . ,n} with 〈|Ci, s|〉  〈|Ci,1, . . . ,Ci,m, t|〉 and
W = 〈C1, . . . ,Ci−1,Ci,1, . . . ,Ci,m,Ci+1, . . . ,Cn〉.
Case 1: (Ci,C′i) ∈ ˙. According to Definition 10, there
are C′i,1, . . . ,C
′
i,m with 〈|C′i, s|〉 ∗ 〈|C′i,1, . . . ,C′i,m, t|〉 and
〈Ci,1, . . . ,Ci,m〉 ˙ 〈C′i,1, . . . ,C′i,m〉.
FromDefinition 10 it follows that Ci,j ˙ C′i,j holds for
all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Case 2: (Ci,C′i) ∈ R. By Definition 11, there are
C′i,1, . . . ,C
′
i,m with 〈|C′i, s|〉 ∗ 〈|C′i,1, . . . ,C′i,m, t|〉 and
Ci,j(R∪ ˙)C′i,j for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
With W′ = 〈C′1, . . . ,C′i−1,C′i,1, . . . ,C′i,m,C′i+1, . . . ,C′n〉
we have 〈|V′, s|〉 ∗ 〈|W′, t|〉 and (W,W′) ∈ Q. As ˙ is
defined to be the union of all symmetric relations with
the property of Definition 10, we see Q ⊆˙. unionsq
Lemma 7
1. If C1 ˙ C′1 and C2 ˙ C′2 then C1;C2 ˙ C′1;C′2.
2. If C1 ˙ C′1 and V2 ˙ V′2 then fork(C1V2) ˙
fork(C′1V
′
2).
3. If C1 ˙ C′1 then while B do C1 ˙ while B do C′1.
4. If C1 ˙ C′1 and C2 ˙ C′2 then if B then C1 else C2 ˙
if B then C′1 else C
′
2.
5. If C1 ˙ C′1, . . . ,Cn ˙ C′n then 〈C1, . . . ,Cn〉 ˙〈C′1, . . . ,C′n〉.
Proof We proceed as in the proof of Lemma 5, only by
using pointwise weak possibilistic bisimulations up to ˙
instead of strong low-bisimulations. unionsq
Proof of Theorem 2 We prove the first assertion for
pointwise weak possibilistic bisimulations (rather than
weak possibilistic bisimulations) by induction on the
term structure of vectors of length 1, i.e., V ∈ ComV .
By Lemma 7(5), the assertion is then lifted to arbitrary
vectors in ComV , and with Lemma 6, we obtain what
we wanted. Let σ , ρ be substitutions that are preserving
and ground for V.
1. Suppose V is skip or an assignment. Then σ(V) =
ρ(V) = V, and the assertion follows by reflexivity
of ˙.
2. SupposeV is of the form α;C′ orC′;α. By induction
hypothesis we have σ(C′) ˙ ρ(C′). σ and ρ are pre-
serving and ground for α, so we see σ(α) ˙ ρ(α).
From Lemma 7(1), σV ˙ ρV follows.
3. SupposeV = C1;C2 withC1,C2 ∈ ComV . By induc-
tion hypothesis we have σC1 ˙ ρC1 and σC2 ˙
ρC2. From Lemma 7(1), σV ˙ ρV follows.
4. Suppose V = while B do C′ with C′ ∈ ComV . By
induction hypothesis we have σC′ ˙ ρC′. From
Lemma 7(3), σV ˙ ρV follows.
5. Suppose V = if B then C1 else C2 with C1,C2 ∈
ComV . By induction hypothesis we have σC1 ˙ ρC1
and σC2 ˙ ρC2. From Lemma 7(4), σV ˙ ρV
follows.
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6. Suppose V = fork(C0〈C1, . . . ,Cn〉) with Ci ∈ ComV
for i = 0, . . . ,n. By induction hypothesis we have
σCi ˙ ρCi for i = 0, . . . ,n. From Lemma 7(5), we
first obtain σ 〈C1, . . . ,Cn〉 ˙ ρ〈C1, . . . ,Cn〉 and then,
by Lemma 7(2), σV ˙ ρV.
The second assertion follows directly from part 1.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3 If V ↪→ V′ : S can be derived then
1. V′ has secure information flow,
2. V  V′ holds, and
3. V′ L S holds.
We first state and prove two lemmas to simplify rea-
soning with L on ComV .
Lemma 8 If V1 L V2 holds for two programs V1,V2 ∈
ComV then σV1 L σV2 holds for each substitution σ
that is preserving (but not necessarily ground).
Proof Given an arbitrary substitution η that is preserv-
ing and ground for σV1 and σV2, we obtain η(σV1) L
η(σV2) from V1 L V2, Definition 5, and the fact that
η ◦ σ is preserving and ground for V1 and V2. Since η
was chosen arbitrarily, σV1 L σV2 follows. unionsq
Lemma 9 Let V,V′,V0,V′0, . . . ,Vn,V′n ∈ ComV be pro-
grams that may containmeta-variables. If Vi L V′i holds
for each i ∈ {0, . . . ,n} according to Definition 5 and
V L V′ can be syntactically derived from the assump-
tions V0 L V′0, …, Vn L V′n with the rules in Figure 3
then V L V′ holds according to Definition 5.
Proof We argue by induction on the size of D, the deri-
vation of V L V′ from V0 L V′0, …, Vn L V′n.
Base case: If D consists of zero rule applications then
V L V′ equals one of the assumptions.
Induction assumption: The proposition holds for
every derivation with less than n rule applications.
Step case: Assume D consists of n rule applications.
We make a case distinction on the last rule applied in D.
Here, we consider only the case where [SComp] is the
last rule applied. The reasoning principle is independent
of the structure of the rule [SComp], and so the cases
for the other rules can be shown along the same lines.
Let C1,C′1,C2,C
′
2 ∈ ComV be arbitrary with C1 L
C′1 andC2 L C
′
2. Let σ be an arbitrary substitution that
is preserving and ground forC1,C′1,C2,C
′
2. FromC1 L
C′1, C2 L C
′
2, and Definition 5 we obtain σC1 L
σC′1 and σC2 L σC
′
2. An application of [SComp] (for
ground programs) yields (σC1; σC2) L (σC′1; σC
′
2).
Since σ(C1;C2) = (σC1; σC2), (σC′1; σC′2) = σ(C′1;C′2),
and σ was chosen freely, we obtain C1;C2 L C′1;C
′
2
from Definition 5. unionsq
Proof of Theorem 3 We prove the three propositions in
different order.
2. By induction on the height of the given derivation of
V ↪→ V′ : S, one obtains V′ = ρV for some preserv-
ing substitution ρ. The assertion follows by applying
Theorem 2.1 to σ(V) and (σρ)(V) for an arbitrary σ
that is preserving and ground for both V and V′.
3. Since V′ L S implies V′ L S according to
Theorem 1, it suffices to show that V ↪→ V′ : S
implies V′ L S. We prove this second proposition
by induction on the minimal height of the given der-
ivation D of V ↪→ V′ : S.
Base case: D consists of a single rule application. We
perform a case distinction on this rule:
[Var] We have V = V′ = S = α for some meta-
variable α ∈ V . Let σ be an arbitrary substitution
that is preserving and ground for α. As σα is a com-
mand in StutV that is free of meta-variables (i.e., a
sequential compositionof skip statements),weobtain
σα L σα from [Skip] and [SComp] in Fig. 3. Hence,
α L α holds.
[Skp] We have V = V′ = S = skip. From [Skip] in
Fig. 3, we obtain skip L skip.
[Assh] We have V = V′ = Id := Exp and S = skip
with Id : high. From [SHA2] in Fig. 3, we obtain
Id := Exp L skip.
[Assl] We have V = V′ = S = Id := Exp with Id :
low and Exp : low. From [LA] in Fig. 3, we obtain
Id := Exp L Id := Exp.
Induction assumption: For any derivation D′ of a
judgment W ↪→ W′ : S′ with height less than the
height of D, W′ L S′ holds.
Step case: We make a case distinction on the rule
applied at the root of D.
[Seq] We have V = C1;C2, V′ = C′1;C′2, and S =
S1;S2 with C1 ↪→ C′1 : S1 and C2 ↪→ C′2 : S2. By
induction assumption, C′1 L S1 and C
′
2 L S2 hold.
An application of [SComp] in Fig. 3 yieldsC′1;C′2 L
S1;S2.
[Par] We have V = 〈C1, . . . ,Cn〉, V′ = 〈C′1, . . . ,C′n〉,
and S = 〈S1, . . . ,Sn〉 with Ci ↪→ C′i : Si for all i ∈
{1, . . . ,n}. By induction assumption, C′i L Si holds
for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. Application of [PComp] in Fig. 3
yields 〈C′1, . . . ,C′n〉 L 〈S1, . . . ,Sn〉.[Frk] We have V = fork(C1V2), V′ = fork(C′1V′2),
and S = fork(S1S2) with C1 ↪→ C′1 : S1 and V2 ↪→
V′2 : S2. By induction assumption, C′1 L S1 and
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V′2 L S2 hold. An application of [Fork] in Fig. 3
yields fork(C′1V
′
2) L fork(S1S2).[Whl]We haveV = while B do C1,V′ = while B do C′1,
and S = while B do S1 withB : low andC1 ↪→ C′1 : S1.
By induction assumption, C′1 L S1 holds. An appli-
cation of [WL] in Fig. 3 yields while B do C′1 L
while B do S1.
[Condl] We have V = if B then C1 else C2, together
withV′ = if B then C′1 else C′2 and S = if B then S1 else
S2 with B : low, C1 ↪→ C′1 : S1, and C2 ↪→ C′2 : S2.
By induction assumption, C′1 L S1 and C
′
2 L
S2 hold. An application of [LIte] in Fig. 3 yields
if B then C′1 else C
′
2 L if B′ then S1 else S2.[Condh] We have V = if B then C1 else C2, together
with V′ = if B then σC′1 else σC′2 and S = skip; σS1
with B : high, C1 ↪→ C′1 : S1, C2 ↪→ C′2 : S2,
and σ ∈ U({S1?LS2}). By induction assumption,
C′1 L S1 and C
′
2 L S2 hold. From Lemma 8, we
obtain σC′1 L σS1 and σC
′
2 L σS2 as σ is preserv-
ing. Then we obtain σC′2 L σS1 from σC′2 L σS2,
σS1 L σS2 (follows from σ ∈ U({S1?LS2})), and
the fact that L is symmetric and transitive. An
application of [SHIte2] in Fig. 3 yields if B then σC′1
else σC′2 L skip; σS1.
1. From V′ L S and the symmetry of L, we obtain
S L V′. ThenV′ L V′ follows from the transitivity
of L. unionsq
A.4 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1 For two commands C1 and C2 in PadV we
have C1 L C2 if and only if const(C1) = const(C2) and
∀α ∈ V : |C1|α = |C2|α .
We define const(C) = |C|skip +
∑
Idh,Exp,Idh:high|C|Idh := Exp, where |C|D denotes the number of occur-
rences of D as a subterm of C.
Proof of Lemma 1 We show each direction of the
implication:
(⇒) Assume C1 L C2. Make a case distinction:
1. Assume const(C1) = const(C2). Let σ be the sub-
stitution mapping all variables in C1 and C2 to .
The judgment σC1 L σC2 is not derivable with
the rules in Fig. 3. According to Definition 5, this
contradicts the assumption C1 L C2, as σ is pre-
serving. Hence, this case is not possible.
2. Assume const(C1) = const(C2) and |C1|α = |C2|α
for somemeta-variable α ∈ V . Let σ be the substitu-
tion mapping α to skip and all other variables in C1
andC2 to . We have const(σC1) = const(σC2) and,
thus, a contradiction to the assumption C1 L C2
(argue like in case 1).
3. Assume const(C1) = const(C2) and |C1|α = |C2|α
for all meta-variables α ∈ V .
The above case distinction is complete as it covers all
possible cases. Under the assumption C1 L C2, only
case 3 is possible. Hence, the implication holds.
(⇐) The argument is by induction on the num-
ber of meta-variables occurring in (C1,C2). Assume
const(C1) = const(C2) and ∀α ∈ V : |C1|α = |C2|α .
Base case: No meta-variables occur in (C1,C2). We
obtain C1 L C2 from const(C1) = const(C2) and C1,
C2 ∈ PadV (argue by induction on const(C1)).
Step case: n + 1 meta-variables occur in (C1,C2) and
the proposition holds for all command pairs with n or
lessmeta-variables. Letα′ beanarbitrary variable occur-
ring in C1 (and, hence, also in C2). Let σ be an arbi-
trary substitution that is preserving and ground for C1
and C2. We decompose σ into two substitutions σ1, σ2
such that σ = σ2 ◦ σ1, dom σ1 = {α′}, and dom σ2 =
dom σ \{α′}. Note that σ1 and σ2 both are preserving.We
have |σ1(C1)|α = |C1|α = |C2|α = |σ1(C2)|α for all α =
α′. Moreover, we have const(σ1(C1)) = const(σ1(C2))
because const(C1) = const(C2) and |C1|α′ = |C2|α′ .
From the induction assumption (nmeta-variables occur
in (σ1(C1), σ1(C2))), we obtain σ1(C1) L σ1(C2). This
means, in particular, σ2(σ1(C1)) L σ2(σ1(C2)) holds.
Since σ = σ2 ◦ σ1 and σ was chosen freely, we obtain
C1 L C2. unionsq
A.5 Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2 Let Vi ∈ Com, with liftings V′i ∈ ComV and
V∗i ∈ MglV for i = 1, 2. Suppose V∗1 (V∗2 ) shares nometa-
variables with V′1, V
′
2, and V
∗
2 (V
′
1, V
′
2, and V
∗
1 ). Then we
have
U({V′1?LV′2}) = ∅ implies U({V∗1?LV∗2 }) = ∅
More precisely, we can find ρ ∈ U({V∗1?LV∗2 }) with
dom(ρ)⊆ var(V∗1 ) ∪ var(V∗2 ).
Proof Suppose σ is a preserving substitution with
σV′1 L σV
′
2. We will inductively construct preserv-
ing substitutions ρ1 with ρ1V∗1 L σV
′
1, and ρ2 with
ρ2V∗2 L σV′2 with the property dom(ρi) ⊆ var(V∗i )
and var(ran(ρi)) ⊆ var(V′i) for i = 1, 2. The meta-
variables in V∗1 and V
∗
2 are disjoint, so ρ = ρ1 ∪ ρ2
is well defined and a unifier of V∗1
?
LV
∗
2 because of
ρV∗1 L σV
′
1 L σV
′
2 L ρV∗2 . We prove the assertion
by induction on the term structure of V∗1 ∈ MglV , start-
ing with V∗1 = C∗1 ∈ MglV and hence V1 = C1 ∈ Com
and V′1 = C′1 ∈ ComV .
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Suppose C∗1 ∈ PadV ∩ MglV . Then by definition of
MglV , C∗1 contains at least one meta-variable α. C
′
1 is
also a lifting of C1, so it must be in PadV ∪ {}. Let
α1, . . . ,αn be the meta-variables in C′1. Define ρ(α) :=
σ(α1); . . . ; σ(αn), and set ρ(Y) =  for all Y = α oc-
curing in C∗1. C
∗
1 and C
′
1 are both liftings of C1, so they
contain the same number of skips and assignments to
high variables. By definition of ρ we see that σC′1 and
ρC∗1 contain the samemeta-variables and the same num-
ber of constants. Applying Lemma 1 we can conclude
that ρC∗1 L σC
′
1. Furthermore, dom(ρ) ⊆ var(C∗1) and
var(ran(ρ)) ⊆ var(C′1) are satisfied.
Suppose C∗1 = P; if B then C∗1,1 else C∗1,2;C∗. The com-
mand C′1 is also a lifting of C1, so it can be written as
P′; if B then C′1,1 else C
′
1,2;C
′, with (possibly empty) com-
mands P′,C′.
IfB is a low conditional, we inductively construct sub-
stitutions ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, ρ4 such that ρ1P L σP′, ρ2C∗1,1 L
σC′1,1, ρ3C
∗
1,2 L σC
′
1,2 and ρ4C
∗ L σC′. The domains
of the ρi are disjoint by the hypothesis that dom(ρi)
is a subset of the meta-variables of the correspond-
ing subcommand and the assumption that every meta-
variable occurs only once in C∗1, so ρ = ρ1 ∪ ρ2 ∪
ρ3 ∪ ρ4 is well defined. Using Lemma 9 we can con-
clude ρC∗1 = ρ1P; if B then ρ2C∗1,1 else ρ3C∗1,2; ρ4C∗ L
σP′; if B then σC′1,1 else σC
′
1,2; σC
′ L σC′1. Further-
more, dom(ρ) ⊆ var(C∗1) and var(ran(ρ)) ⊆ var(C′1) are
satisfied.
If B is a high conditional, the precondition σC′1 L
σC′2 together with the definition of L on high condi-
tionals shows that σC′1,1 L σC
′
1,2 holds. After applying
the induction hypothesis, we obtain ρ2,1 and ρ2,2 with
ρ2,1C∗1,1 L σC
′
1,1 L σC
′
1,2 L ρ2,2C
∗
1,2 and ρ1, ρ3 with
ρ1P L σP′ and ρ3C∗ L σC′. With ρ = ρ1 ∪ ρ2,1 ∪
ρ2,2 ∪ ρ3, we see that ρC∗1 is equal to ρ1P; if B then ρ2,1
C∗1,1 else ρ2,2C
∗
1,2; ρ3C
∗ and, therefore, ρC∗1 L ρ1P; skip;
ρ2,1C∗1,1; ρ3C
∗ L σP′; skip; σC′1,1; σC′ L σP′;
if B then σC′1,1 else σC
′
1,2; σC
′ L σC′1. Furthermore,
dom(ρ) ⊆ var(C∗1) and var(ran(ρ)) ⊆ var(C′1) are
satisfied.
The remaining induction steps for MglV and the lift-
ing to MglV can be treated in the same way as the low
conditional case.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 3 Let V ∈ Com and V ∈ ComV . If V ⇀ V can
be derived, then
1. V is a lifting of V and
2. V ∈ MglV .
Proof The proof of assertion 1 is a straightforward
inductive argument over the structure of the derivation
of V ⇀ V and an inspection of each rule in Figure 5.
For proving assertion 2 we proceed by induction on
the term structure of V ∈ Com: First, suppose
V = C ∈ Com.
If C = skip, we have C ⇀ skip;X, which is in MglV .
The same holds for C = h := Exp.
If C = l := Exp, we have C ⇀ X; l := Exp;Y, which is
in MglV .
If C = while B do C′, we get C ⇀ C = X;while B do C′;
Y with C′ ⇀ C′. By induction hypothesis, C′ ∈ MglV ,
and by definition of MglV we have C ∈ MglV .
If C = fork(C′V), we have C ⇀ C = X; fork(C′V);Y
with C′ ⇀ C′ and V ⇀ V. By induction hypothesis,
C′ ∈ MglV , andV ∈ MglV and by definition ofMglV we
have C ∈ MglV .
If C = if B then C1 else C2, we have C ⇀ C with C =
X; if B then C1 else C2;Y withC1 ⇀ C1 andC2 ⇀ C2. By
induction hypothesis, C1,C2 ∈ MglV , and by definition
of MglV we have C ∈ MglV .
If C = C1;C2 let C1 ⇀ C1, and let C2 ⇀ C2. By
induction hypothesis C1,C2 ∈ MglV . As C1 ∈ MglV ,
we can write it as (implicit induction on MglV) C1 =
C′1;P;X for a maximal P ∈ PadV and X ∈ V . Observe
that P;C2 ∈ MglV , and thus C′1;P;C2 ∈ MglV . This is
what we wanted, as we have C1;C2 ⇀ C′1;P;C2.
IfV = 〈C1, . . . ,Cn〉 ∈ Com, we haveV ⇀ V withV =
〈C1, . . . ,Cn〉 with Ci ⇀ Ci for i = 1, . . . ,n. By induction
hypothesis, C1, . . . ,Cn ∈ MglV , and thus V ∈ MglV .
The assertion that each meta-variable occurs at most
once follows from the requirement that each meta-var-
iable inserted while lifting must be fresh. unionsq
A.7 Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 4 Let Vi ∈ Com with liftings V′i ,Vi ∈ ComV
for i = 1, 2. Suppose V1 (V2) shares no meta-variables
with V′1, V
′
2, and V2 (V
′
1, V
′
2, and V1). If V1 ⇀ V1 and
V2 ⇀ V2 can be derived, then
U({V′1?LV′2}) = ∅ implies U({V1?LV2}) = ∅ .
Proof From Lemma 3, it follows that V1,V2 ∈ MglV .
The claim then follows immediately by applying
Lemma 2. unionsq
A.8 Proof of Theorem 5
Theorem 5 Let V′,V ∈ ComV be liftings of V ∈ Com.
Suppose V shares no meta-variables with V′ and V ⇀ V
can be derived. Then
U({V′?LV′}) = ∅ implies U({V?LV}) = ∅.
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Proof From Lemma 3 follows that V ∈ MglV , hence
it suffices to show the assertion for an arbitrary V∗ ∈
MglV . We will inductively construct a substitution ρ,
with ρV∗?LρV∗ and dom(ρ) ⊆ var(V∗), starting with
V∗ = C∗ ∈ MglV and V′ = C′ ∈ ComV .
Suppose C∗ ∈ PadV . Then the identity is in
U({C∗?LC∗}).
Suppose C∗ = P; l := Exp;C∗1. C′ is also a lifting of C,
so C′ = P′; l := Exp;C′1 with possibly empty P′,C′. From
σC′ L σC′, and the definition of L we know that
Exp : low and U({C′1?LC′1}) = ∅. We apply induction
hypothesis to obtain ρ ∈ U({C∗1?LC∗1). By Lemma 9 we
obtain ρC∗ L ρC∗.
Suppose C∗ = P; if B then C∗1 else C∗2;C∗3 with B : low.
C′ is also a lifting ofC, soC′ = P′; if B then C′1 else C′2;C′3.
From σC′ L σC′, and the definition of L we know
that U({C′i?LC′i}) = ∅ for i = 1, 2, 3. We apply induction
hypothesis to obtain ρi ∈ U({C∗i ?LC∗i }) for i = 1, 2, 3.
ρ = ρ1 ∪ ρ2 ∪ ρ3 is well-defined as the domains are
pairwise disjoint, and ρ ∈ U({C∗?LC∗}).
SupposeC∗ = P; if B then C∗1 else C∗2;C∗3 withB : high.
We then know that C′ = P′; if B then C′1 else C′2;C′3
because both C′ and C∗ are liftings of C. From σC′ L
σC′, and the definition of L we have σC′1 L σC
′
2. By
Lemma 2 we obtain ρ1 with ρ1C∗1 L ρ1C
∗
2. (Note that
every meta-variable occurs at most once in (C∗1,C
∗
2)).
Applying induction hypothesis to P and C∗3 we obtain
ρ0 with ρ0P L ρ0P and ρ2 with ρ2C∗3 L ρ2C∗3. With
ρ = ρ0 ∪ρ1 ∪ρ2 we have ρC∗ L ρC∗, which is what we
wanted.
The remaining induction steps for MglV and the lift-
ing to MglV can be treated in the same way as the low
conditional case. unionsq
A.9 Proof of Lemma 4
Lemma 4 Let V1,V2 ∈ SliceV where no meta-variable
occurs more than once in (V1,V2). If V1?LV2 :: η, then
1. η ∈ U({V1?LV2}), and
2. η is idempotent, and
3. dom(η) ∪ var(ran(η)) ⊆ var(V1) ∪ var(V2), and
4. V1,V2 ∈ MglV implies ηV1, ηV2 ∈ MglV ,
where var(·) returns the set of meta-variables occurring
in a set of commands in ComV .
Proof For proving assertions 1, 2, and 3 we proceed by
structural induction on the derivation treeD of the judg-
ment V1?LV2 :: η. Note that assertion 2 is equivalent to
dom(η) ∩ var(ran(η)) = ∅.
If D consists of an application of the rule [Var1] we
have V1 = α and V2 = C. The assertion follows, as α
does not occur in var(C) by assumption. [Var2] follows
similarly.
If D consists of an application of the rule [Asg] the
assertion follows directly by definition of L.
If the root of D is an application of rule [Seq1], we
have V1 = α;C1 and V2 = C2, and C1?LC2 :: η. By
hypothesis, ηC1 L ηC2 holds. η[α\]α;C1 = ηC1 L
ηC2 L η[α\]C2, as α does not occur in C1,C2. [Seq′1]
follows similarly.
If the root of D is an application of rule [Seq2], we
have V1 = skip;C1 and V2 = skip;C2, and C1?LC2 :: η.
By hypothesis, ηC1 L ηC2 holds. Then, by Lemma 9
we also have η(skip;C1) L η(skip;C2).
If the root of D is the application of [Ite], we have
V1 = if B1 then C1 else C2 and V2 = if B2 then C′1 else C′2,
together with B1 ≡ B2 and C1?LC′1 :: η1, C2?LC′2 :: η2.
By hypothesis we have ηi ∈ U({Ci?LC′i}), and dom(ηi)∪
var(ran(ηi)) ⊆ var(Ci) ∪ var(C′i) for i = 1, 2. As
(var(C1) ∪ var(C′1)) and (var(C2) ∪ var(C′2)) are dis-
joint by hypothesis, η = η1 ∪ η2 is well-defined and
dom(η)∪var(ran(η)) ⊆ var(V1)∪var(V2) and dom(η)∩
var(ran(η)) = ∅ hold. With the help of Lemma 9 we see
that η is indeed a unifier. The remaining cases can be
proved along the same lines.
We prove assertion 4 by induction on the term struc-
ture of V1. We treat the case of commands V1 = S1 and
V2 = S2 ∈ SliceV first.
Suppose S1 ∈ StutV . Only the rules [Var1],[Var2],
[Seq1], [Seq′1] and [Seq2] apply, so S2 ∈ StutV . From
S1,S2 ∈ MglV we see that both commands contain a
terminal meta-variable. The two base cases for the der-
ivation, [Var1] and [Var2] map the terminal variable at
the end of one command to the end of the other com-
mand. Thus we see that both ηS1 and ηS2 have terminal
meta-variables. As (S1,S2) contains everymeta-variable
only once, the same holds for ηS1 and ηS2, and hence
they are elements of MglV .
Suppose S1 = P1; if B1 then S1,1 else S1,2;S1,3 with
B : low. From S1?LS2 :: η and the rules [Ite] [Seq3] and[Seq4] in Figure 6 we get S2 = P2; if B2 then S2,1 else S2,2;
S2,3, with B1 ≡ B2 and P1?LP2 :: η0, S1,1?LS2,1 :: η1,
S1,2?LS2,2 :: η2, and S1,3?LS2,3 :: η3 are derivable. By
induction hypothesis have η0P1, η1S1,1, η2S1,2, η3S1,3 ∈
MglV . With η = η0 ∪ η1 ∪ η2 ∪ η3 and the fact that
the domains and variable ranges of the ηi are mutually
disjoint we have ηS1 = η0P1; if B1 then η1S1,1 else η2S1,2;
η3S1,3, which is in MglV as it contains every meta-
variable at most once.
All other constructors and the lifting to command
vectors can be treated in the same way as the low
conditional. unionsq
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Fig. 7 Resembling
commands
A.10 Proof of Theorem 6
Theorem 6 Let V ∈ Com, V,W ∈ ComV , W be a lifting
of V, and V ⇀ V.
1. If there is a preserving substitution σ with σW L
σW, then V ↪→′ V′ : S for some V′,S ∈ ComV .
2. If W ↪→ W′ : S for some W′,S ∈ ComV then V ↪→′
V′ : S′ for some V′,S′ ∈ ComV .
The proof of Theorem 6 essentially proceeds by induc-
tion on the term structure of W. The main technical
difficulty lies in showing that if the two branches C1,C2
of a conditional with high guard, with Ci ↪→′ C′i : Si for
i = 1, 2, unify, then we can also unify the corresponding
slices, i.e., S1?LS2 :: η. To prove this, we proceed in two
steps:
1. We show that the slices corresponding to two com-
mandswithunifier are structurally equivalent “mod-
ulo” commands in PadV , and that they are in MglV
(Definition 12, Lemma 10).
2. We show that we can unify every two structurally
equivalent slices, given that they are elements of
MglV (Lemma 12.1)
Lemma 11 and Lemma 12.2 are rather technical and
will be needed during the proof. We first formulate the
above steps in terms of definitions and lemmata, before
we proceed with the proof of Theorem 6.
To simplify the atomic treatment of subcommands in
StutV of commands in SliceV in inductive arguments, we
introduce the language Slice+V . (Note the resemblance
to the definition of MglV). Define the set Slice
+
V by the
grammar:
L ::=P | P; Idl := Exp;L | P; if B then L1 else L2;L
| P;while B do L1;L | P; fork(L1V);L
where L,L1,L2 are placeholders for commands in
Slice+V , V is a placeholder for a command vector in
Slice+V , and P is a placeholder for a command in StutV ∪{}. By a straightforward induction one proves that
SliceV ⊆ Slice+V .
Definition 12 The binary relation .= on Slice+V is defined
as the reflexive, symmetric and transitive closure of the
relation inductively defined in Fig. 7. We call commands
V,V′ ∈ MglV with V .= V′ resembling.
Lemma 10 Let C,C1,C2 ∈ MglV . Then the following
assertions hold:
1. C ↪→′ C′ : S implies S ∈ MglV ∩SliceV and var(S) ⊆
var(C).
2. U({C1?LC2}) = ∅ and Ci ↪→′ C′i : Si for i = 1, 2
implies S1
.= S2.
Proof 1. It is easy to see that S ∈ SliceV holds, so we
concentrate on containment in MglV . We proceed
by induction on the term structure of C ∈ MglV .
Suppose C ∈ PadV ∩ MglV . By definition of MglV ,
C has a terminal meta-variable. Then clearly S ∈
MglV as it contains a terminal meta-variable and no
assignments. The condition on the meta-variables is
fulfilled.
Suppose now C = P; if B then C1 else C2;C3 with
B : low and C ↪→′ C′ : S. Then by definition of
↪→′ we have P ↪→′ P′ : S0, C1 ↪→′ C′1 : S1, C2 ↪→′
C′2 : S2 and C3 ↪→′ C′3 : S3. By induction hypoth-
esis, S0,S1,S2,S3 ∈ MglV and the condition on the
meta-variables holds. By definition of MglV , S =
S0; if B then S1 else S2;S3 ∈ MglV , and the condition
on the meta-variables follows.
Suppose now C = P; if B then C1 else C2;C3 with
B : high. We have C ↪→′ C′ : S, so by defini-
tion of ↪→′ we have P ↪→′ P′ : S0, C1 ↪→′ C′1 :
S1, C2 ↪→′ C′2 : S2 and C3 ↪→′ C′3 : S3 and also
S1 L S2 :: η for some η. By induction hypoth-
esis, S1,S2,S3 ∈ MglV and the condition on the
meta-variables holds. As var(Si) ⊆ var(Ci), (S1,S2)
contains every meta-variable at most once. With
Lemma 4.4we see that ηS1 ∈ MglV , and everymeta-
variableoccurs atmost once inηS1. FromLemma4.3
it follows that dom(η) ∪ ran(var(η)) is a subset of
the meta-variables in S1 and S2 and hence the con-
dition on the meta-variables is fulfilled for S =
(S0; skip; ηS1);S3. S0; skip ∈ StutV , and so by the defi-
nition of MglV , S0; skip; ηS1 ∈ MglV . By a straight-
forward induction one shows that D1;D2 ∈ MglV
whenever D1,D2 ∈ MglV , and we see that S =
(S0; skip; ηS1);S3 and hence in MglV .
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The cases for the other constructors follow along the
same lines as the low conditional.
2. Let σC1 L σC2. By symmetry and transitivity of
L we conclude σC1 L σC1 and σC2 L σC2.
With help of Lemma 11 we obtain C′′1 ,C
′′
2 ∈ SliceV
with S1
.= C′′1 L σC1 L σC2 L C′′2
.= S2.
Lemma 12.1 shows that C′′1 L C
′′
2 implies C
′′
1
.= C′′2 ,
and by transitivity of .= we get S1 .= S2. unionsq
Lemma 11 Let C ∈ MglV with σ ∈ U({C L C}) and
C ↪→′ C′ : S. Then there is C′′ ∈ SliceV with C′′ L σC
and C′′ .= S.
Proof Weproceedby structural induction onC ∈ MglV .
Suppose C ∈ PadV . Choose C′′ as σC, where all
assignments to high variables are replaced by skips. We
haveC′′ ∈ StutV .We also have S ∈ StutV , and soC′′ .= S.
Suppose C = P; if B then C1 else C2;C3 with B : low.
We have σC L σC, so by definition of L we obtain
σP L σP and σCi L σCi for i = 1, 2, 3. From the
precondition C ↪→′ C′ : S and the definition of ↪→′ we
get P ↪→′ P′ : S0 and Ci ↪→′ C′i : Si for i = 1, 2, 3. We
apply induction hypothesis to the corresponding com-
mand-pairs and obtain P′′,C′′i with P′′ L σP, P′′
.= S0,
and C′′i L σCi, C′′i
.= Si for i = 1, 2, 3. Then we can
conclude C′′ = P′′; if B then C′′1 else C′′2 ;C′′3 L σC, as
well as C′′ .= S.
Suppose C = P; if B then C1 else C2;C3 with B : high.
We have σC L σC, so by definition of L we obtain
σP L σP, σC1 L σC1σC3 L σC3 and σC1 L σC2.
By symmetry and transitivity ofL we concludeσC2 L
σC2. From the precondition C ↪→′ C′ : S and the defini-
tion of ↪→′ we get P ↪→′ P′ : S0 andCi ↪→′ C′i : Si for i =
1, 2, 3.We apply induction hypothesis to the correspond-
ing command-pairs and obtain P′′,C′′i with the desired
properties for i = 1, 2, 3. Define C′′ as P′′; skip;C′′1 ;C′′3 ∈
SliceV . We have C′′ L σC by Lemma 9. On the other
hand, S = S0; skip; ηS1;S3 for some preserving substitu-
tion η. We are left to show S .= C′′. From hypothesis we
know C′′1
.= S1 and C′′3 .= S3. A straightforward induc-
tion shows thatS1
.= ηS1 for every preservingη.Another
straightforward induction shows that .= is a congruence
with respect to sequential composition and so we con-
clude C′′ = P′′; skip;C′′1 ;C′′3
.= S0; skip; ηS1;S3 = S.
The other constructors follow along the same lines as
the low conditional. unionsq
Lemma 12 Let S1,S2 ∈ SliceV . Then the followingholds:
1. S1 L S2 implies S1
.= S2.
2. if S1,S2 ∈ MglV and S1 .= S2 then there is an η with
S1?LS2 :: η.
Proof We prove assertion 1 by induction on the struc-
ture of S1, where we make use of the fact that SliceV ⊆
Slice+V . If S1 ∈ StutV , then by definition of L and the
precondition S2 ∈ SliceV we know that S2 ∈ StutV ,
and hence S1
.= S2. If S1 = P1; if B1 then S1,1 else
S1,2;S1,3 withB1 : low, then by definition ofL we know
that S2 = P2; if B2 then S2,1 else S2,2;S2,3 with P1,P2 = 
or P1 L P2, and S1,i L S2,i for i = 1, 2, 3 and B1 ≡ B2.
By definition of .=, P1 .= P2 holds, and by induction
hypothesis we see S1,i
.= S2,i for i = 1, 2, 3. By definition
of .=we conclude S1 .= S2. The other constructors follow
in a similar fashion.
We prove assertion 2 by induction on the term struc-
ture of S1:
Suppose S1 ∈ StutV . Then by definition of .=, S2 must
also be in StutV . S1,S2 ∈ MglV , hence they have termi-
nal meta-variables. A simple induction on the length of
S1 shows that S1 L S2 :: η is derivable.
Suppose S1 = P1; if B1 then S1,1 else S1,2;S1,3, where
P1,S1,1,S1,2,S1,3 are elements ofMglV ∩SliceV . By defi-
nition of .= and MglV we get S2 = P2; if B2 then S2,1 else
S2,2;S2,3 withP2,S2,1,S2,2,S2,3 ∈ MglV ∩SliceV andP1 .=
P2, S1,i
.= S2,i for i = 1, 2, 3, and B1 ≡ B2. We apply
induction hypothesis and obtain P1?LP2 :: σ0, and
S1,i?LS2,i :: σi for i = 1, 2, 3. We can conclude S1?LS2 ::
σ with σ = ⋃3i=0 σi by definition of the unification cal-
culus. The other cases follow along the same lines. unionsq
Proof of Theorem 6:
1. Let W be an arbitrary lifting of V. From Theorem 5
follows that σW L σW implies U(V L V) = ∅.
From Lemma 3 we see that V ∈ MglV .
Restricting ourselves to commands inComV for the
moment and substitutingC forV, it suffices to show
the assertion
∃σ .σC L σC ⇒ C ↪→′ C′ : S
for all C ∈ MglV . We proceed by induction on the
term structure of C.
If C ∈ PadV , we always have C ↪→′ C′ : S.
If C = P; Idl := Exp;C1, and σC L σC, then we
have σP L σP and σC1 L σC1 and Exp : low by
definition of L. By applying induction hypothesis
we obtain P ↪→′ P′ : S0 and C1 ↪→′ C′1 : S1. By defi-
nition of ↪→′ this implies C ↪→′ P′; Idl := Exp;C′1 :
S0; Idl := Exp;S1.
If C = P; if B then C1 else C2;C3 with B : low, and
σC L σC, then we have σP L σP and σCi L
σCi for i = 1, 2, 3. By applying induction hypothe-
sis we obtain P ↪→′ P′ : S0 and Ci ↪→′ C′i : Si for
i = 1, 2, 3. By definition of ↪→′ this implies C ↪→′
P′; if B then C′1 else C
′
2;C
′
3 : S0; if B then S1 else S2;S3
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If C = P; if B then C1 else C2;C3 with B : high, and
σC L σC, then we have σP L σP and σCi L
σCi for i = 1, 3. Furthermore we have σC1 L σC2,
from which we get σC2 L σC2 by transitivity and
symmetry of L. Induction hypothesis yields P ↪→′
P′ : S0 and Ci ↪→′ C′i : Si for i = 1, 2, 3. Every meta-
variable occurs at most once in C, hence the same
holds true for the subterms C1,C2.
Lemma 10 shows that S1,S2 ∈ MglV ∩ SliceV , S1 .=
S2, and every meta-variable occurs at most once in
(S1,S2). Lemma 12.2 implies that there is η with
S1?LS2 :: η. η is a unifier of S1,S2, as Lemma 4
shows. We conclude C ↪→′ P′; if B then ηC′1 else ηC′2;
C′3 : S0; skip; ηS1;S3, which is what we wanted. The
cases for the other constructors follow along the
same lines as the low conditional. The assertion can
then simply be lifted to command vectors.
2. By a straightforward induction over the derivation
tree it follows thatW ↪→W′ : S impliesW′ = σW for
a preserving substitution σ . In the proof of
Theorem3 itwas shown thatS L W′ holds.By sym-
metry and transitivity of L we obtain σW L σW.
The assertion now follows directly from part 1 of
Theorem 6. unionsq
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